Saturday, 12 January 2019

Allegations based on status of Poverty, Gender Justice and human rights via “354 me band kara dungi”


Allegations based on status of poverty and human rights via
“354 me band kara dungi”
It was evening of Jan 11, 2019. I was enjoying tea with my two friends in the canteen of the Indian Law Institute, New Delhi. Two ladies (a mother and a daughter who seems to be an advocate) rushed to the canteen inquiring about their mobile phone. They alleged that while they were taking lunch, cleaning staff of canteen has taken the mobile phone while collecting the used plates and glass from the table. They were very much worried and agitated which was obvious. They were asking the canteen employee to return the cell phone and indicating that they can find it easily because of some influential source. I, with my friends requested them to cool down and make a call on the number. The young advocate made a call and showed me that the number is still ringing. We noticed that the call is responding some were because we could hear the ring of a phone. Suddenly she found that the cell phone was placed on the seat of the chair where they were taking lunch. They seemed happy but were not in a mood to accept the fault on their side. Now the owner of canteen came and asked her that why did she allege the canteen staff that they have stolen it. There were a few exchange of words of allegations against each other. We again requested them to leave the matter as the cell phone was recovered. The young lawyer asked her mother to leave the premise and the mother left the canteen. The young lady lawyer was in adamant to engage in verbal fight. Now she also started speaking in English, “don’t talk to me loud” etc. As we were there we can say that the canteen owner did expressed his loud displeasure on the allegation of taking away mobile phone while collecting used utensils, he did not speak anything which was objectionable. The lady lawyer left the canteen with the last sentence which was height of her unruly behaviour. She told “ 354 me band kara dungi.” Though my friends and canteen owner could not realise immediately what it meant, I could easily understand it. (Section 354 of IPC deals with “Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty” which has been amended in 2013 with enhanced penalty. CrPC 1973 was also amended and special procedure for registration of FIR by a lady police officer has been made and non registration of FIR under section 354 is an offence under section 166A of IPC). Canteen staff was advised that he should call 100 and inform that a lady has threatened like this. The police came and they also met me in my chamber. The story was narrated to the police officer. One diploma student of the Indian Law Institute, who was also a lawyer commented that that a few persons like her are bringing disrepute to the noble profession of Bar.  
The misuse of law has emerged as a necessary evil. While there is no denying that special laws and procedure is essential to protect the cause of gender justice, it is equally important that the misuse of laws be “nipped in its bud.” Such misuse are no more in margins and cannot be avoided as a number of high courts and a few Supreme Court judgements indicate (specially in sexual assault cases). The human rights movement to promote the cause of gender justice through criminal laws will lose its vigour if the misuse of laws by female remain unaddressed. I have also witnessed that various distinguished scholars and feminist authors are not willing to accept this fact as serious enough and they either feel the misuse does not exist or it is media projection or overrating the problem or even normalising such instances. The reaction of esteemed woman organisations on Arnesh Kumar judgement or Rajesh Sharma judgement also reflects the scenario. This comment is not based on one incident at canteen and not a generalisation. This feeling is based on certain judicial decisions which categorically admitted the misuse. News papers do cover similar items indicating abuse of female related laws almost every month. This feeling is also based on interaction with police and judicial officers. A dissertation of the Indian Law Institute submitted under this author also form the foundation of this feeling. However, this feeling is yet to be a research finding. Misuse of any law (especially those which deal with half of the population of country) is a big hurdle in the march of gender justice movement to protect, promote and preserve the human rights of woman.
This leads me to two observations. One, researchers need to focus on this aspect to dispassionately examine whether such abuse is really serious to take note of. Or is such instance of abuse avoidable as a part of necessary evil of any criminal law. They should suggest socio-legal measures to check this growing tendency, if it is really acute.  Two, it is very easy to allege especially when a poor and weak person is involved. The status of poverty or being needy (financially) makes a person (a daily wager, a labour, a canteen staff, a security guard, a driver, a domestic servant, a cleaning staff, a beggar etc) an easy prey of our judgement accusation based on fictional thinking and classical presumption that crimes are generally “caused by poverty or by personal and social characteristics believed to be associated statistically with poverty, including feeblemindedness, psychopathic deviations, slum neighbourhoods, and deteriorated families” which was refuted by Sutherland. The allegations and accusations on someone because of a person’s status of poverty or being in lower income group is a gross human rights violations by those similar to non state actors.

Thursday, 20 September 2018

Instant Triple Talaq Ordinance तीन तलाक अध्यादेश २०१८ [मुस्लिम महिला (विवाह अधिकारों का संरक्षण) अध्यादेश, २०१८] :

तीन तलाक अध्यादेश २०१८ [मुस्लिम महिला (विवाह अधिकारों का संरक्षण) अध्यादेश २०१८] सारे देश में २० सितम्बर २०१८ से लागू हो गया है लेकिन खेद है कि तकनीकी कारणों से यह जम्मू कश्मीर में लागू नहीं होगा. इस अध्यादेश में कुल ७ प्रावधान हैं. यह कानून केवल तत्काल तीन तलाक (तलाक ए बिद्दत) के मामलों में लागू है. उसे अवैध और अपराध घोषित करता है. मुस्लिम विधि में दिए जाने वाले अन्य प्रकार के तलाक पर यह क़ानून लागू नहीं है, वे अभी भी वैध हैं. एक स्वागत योग्य कदम है.
यह कई बार सुनने और पढने को मिलता है कि मुस्लिम पति ने अपनी पत्नी को तलाक तलाक तलाक कह दिया और अब उससे पत्नी का कोई रिश्ता नहीं है. इसे तत्काल तीन तलाक या तलाक ए बिद्दत कहा जाता है. इस क़ानून की धारा ३ के अनुसार पति द्वारा तत्काल तीन तलाक (तलाक ए बिद्दत) कहना गैर कानूनी और शून्य है और उसके तीन तलाक कहने का विवाह पर कोई असर नहीं पड़ेगा. न ही वह अब हराम होगी और न ही उसे हलाला करना पड़ेगा. (हलाला का अर्थ है—तलाकशुदा मुस्लिम पत्नी द्वारा पति के अलावे किसी अन्य व्यक्ति से शारीरिक सम्बन्ध बनाना जिसके बाद वह पुनः अपने पति के साथ पत्नी के रूप में रह सकती है. हलाला वास्तव में रेप या बलात्कार की श्रेणी में आता है क्योंकि अधिकांश हलाला मामलों में पत्नी राजी खुशी से पति के अलावा अन्य व्यक्ति से सम्बन्ध नहीं बनाती.) इस नए क़ानून की धारा ३ वास्तव में शायरा बानो के मामले में सर्वोच्च न्यायालय के निर्णय (२२ अगस्त २०१७) की विधायी स्वीकृति है. शायरा बानो के मुकदमे में संविधान पीठ के पांच सदस्यों में से तीन सदस्यों ने बहुमत से तत्काल तीन तलाक को गैर कानूनी माना था. (दो जजों ने इसे असांविधानिक माना जबकि एक जज ने इस्लाम के विरुद्ध बताया था). दो अल्पमत जजों ने इसे गैर कानूनी तो नहीं माना लेकिन गलत करार दिया और संसद को इसपर विधि बनाने का सुझाव दिया. तीन तलाक अध्यादेश २०१८ की धारा ३ का यह अर्थ हुआ कि तीन तलाक के कारण न तो मुस्लिम महिला को उसके घर से निकलना होगा और न ही कोई उसे निकाल सकता और न ही घर आने से रोक सकता है, न उसे धर्म के नाम पर हलाला जैसे कृत्य के लिए बाध्य होना होगा.
धारा ४ के अनुसार पति द्वारा तीन तलाक बोलने को अपराध घोषित किया गया है. ऐसा बोलने पर या लिखने पर या waatsapp पर या पत्र द्वारा या vdo कॉल पर आदि तरीकों से तत्काल तीन तलाक देने पर पति को तीन साल तक की जेल हो सकती है. ऐसी सैकड़ों घटनाएं विगत अनेक वर्षों से होती आ रही थीं. यहाँ तक कि सर्वोच्च न्यायलय के निर्णय के बाद भी ८० के आस पास ऐसी घटनाएं हुई थी. भारतीय समाज में चाहे हिन्दू हो या मुस्लिम, पुरुष स्त्रियों पर अनेक बार अकारण निरंकुश तरीके से व्यवहार करते हैं, क्रूरता करते हैं. इसी कारण दहेज़ क़ानून १९६१ में आया. इसी कारण से 498A, भारतीय दंड संहिता में १९८३ में लाया गया. स्त्रियों के जानोमाल और सम्मान की रक्षा के लिए अन्य प्रावधान लाये गए. इनसे भारतीय समाज के सामंतवादी मानसिकता वाले पुरुष और उनका साथ देने वाले परिवार के लोगों में थोडा क़ानून का भय भी आया. यद्यपि कि इससे स्थिति में बहुत सुधार नहीं आया है और इन कानूनों का अनेक बार दुरूपयोग भी हो रहा है. लेकिन क्रूरता और मनमानेपन के काम को अपराध घोषित करने से कुछ लगाम लगी है. चुकी मुस्लिम समुदाय में भी तत्काल तीन तलाक क्रूरता और मनमानापन का आसन जरिया बन गया था, मुस्लिम पत्नियों और उनके बच्चों का जीवन, उनकी गरिमा और प्रतिष्ठा विनष्ट हो रही थी, सर्वोच्च न्यायालय के आदेश के बाद भी उसका कोई असर नहीं दीख रहा था और न ही मुस्लिम धार्मिक नेता इस अन्याय को कम करने के लिए कोई ठोस प्रयास कर रहे थे, न ही बड़ी संख्या में मुस्लिम बुद्धिजीवी तत्काल तीन तलाक की बुराई को रोकने के लिए खुल कर सामने आ रहे थे. इसलिए तत्काल तीन तलाक को अपराध घोषित करने के अलावा कोई चारा नहीं था.
धारा ५ के अनुसार पत्नी को पति से अपना और अपने बच्चे के भरण पोषण के लिए रोज का खर्च लेने का अधिकार है. यह प्रावधान इसलिए आवश्यक था क्योंकि पुलिस में मामला जाने के बाद पति या उसके परिवार के लोग बदला लेने के लिए पत्नी को उसकी रोज की जरूरत से महरूम कर सकते हैं.
धारा ६ में उसे अधिकार है कि वह अवयस्क बच्चे (१८ साल तक ) को अपने पास रख सकती है. उसकी कस्टडी उसे दी जायेगी.
धारा ७ (क) के अनुसार तत्काल तीन तलाक का अपराध आंशिक रूप से ही संज्ञेय है. अर्थात, पुलिस तत्काल तीन तलाक का मुकदमा केवल तभी दर्ज करेगी और पति को गिरफ्तार केवल तभी किया जा सकता है जबकि तत्काल तीन तलाक का मामला पत्नी स्वयं या उसके निकट के रिश्तेदार दर्ज करते हैं. यदि तत्काल तीन तलाक की सूचना पत्नी के दोस्तों या दूर के रिश्तेदारों या पड़ोसियों से मिलती है तो पुलिस FIR दर्ज करने के लिए बाध्य नहीं है और न ही मजिस्ट्रेट की अनुमति के बिना ही उसे गिरफ्तार कर सकती है. धारा ७ (ख) के अनुसार यह अपराध compoundable या शमनीय है अर्थात पत्नी चाहे तो मजिस्ट्रेट की अनुमति से इस मामले को रफा दफा करा सकती है. धारा ७ (ग) के अनुसार यदि पत्नी या उसके निकट के रिश्तेदारों ने तत्काल तीन तलाक का मामला दर्ज कराया है, और पुलिस ने उसे गिरफ्तार किया है, तो बेल या जमानत देने के पहले मजिस्ट्रेट पीड़ित मुस्लिम पत्नी को जरूर सुनेगा, और तभी उचित आधारों पर जमानत देगा. यह आवश्यक नहीं है कि पुलिस उसे गिरफ्तार करे ही क्योंकि ७ साल से कम की सजा वाले में पुलिस को धारा ४१क दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता, CrPC 1973 के अंतर्गत पहले नोटिस देना जरूरी है. बिना नोटिस केवल आपवादिक दशा में ही गिरफतार कर सकती है, जैसे आरोपी से ख़तरा हो, भाग जाने की संभावना हो आदि. [अर्नेश कुमार के मामले में भी २ जुलाई २०१४ को सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की दो न्यायाधीशों की पीठ ने यही निर्देश जारी किया है कि अनावश्यक गिरफ्तारी होने पर पुलिस के विरुद्ध विभागीय कार्यवाही होगी और न्यायालय की अवमानना का मामला भी बनेगा. १४ सितम्बर २०१८ को सोशल एक्शन फोरम फार मानव अधिकार (या राजेश शर्मा-२) के मामले में सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की पूर्ण पीठ (तीन न्यायाधीश) ने अर्नेश कुमार के निर्देशों पर अपनी मुहर लगा दी है.] इसलिये जब तक आवश्यक न हो पुलिस मुस्लिम पति को गिरफ्तार नहीं कर सकती. यदि पति पत्नी से गिले शिकवे दूर कर ले तो तत्काल तीन तलाक का अपराध को कोर्ट समाप्त कर देगी. उसे जेल जाने की नौबत ही नहीं आयेगी. इस प्रकार तीन तलाक अध्यादेश २०१८ [मुस्लिम महिला (विवाह अधिकारों का संरक्षण) अध्यादेश, २०१८] न केवल मुस्लिम स्त्रियों के “अबला जीवन” को “सबला जीवन” में बदलेगा, उनके दुःख को थोड़ा कम करेगा, वरन भारत में हर धर्म की महिलाओं पर हो रहे विभेद और अत्याचार को रोकने की दिशा में एक मील का पत्थर साबित होगा. हिन्दू पारिवारिक विधियों में भी जो बुराइयां हैं या कमियां हैं, उन्हें भी क़ानून बनाकर दूर करने की जरूरत है.

Saturday, 8 September 2018

District Court Judges who became judge of the Supreme Court-


यह अक्सर कहा जाता है कि उच्चतम न्यायालय में केवल पहुंच वालों की या बड़े वकीलों  जज के घर वालों की नियुक्ति होती है। यह बात सच हो सकती है लेकिन यह भी सच है कि सामान्य घर के लोग (जस्टिस कपाड़िया पूर्व cji), भी अपनी मेहनत और लगन से शीर्ष तक पहुंचते हैं। मित्रों के साथ whatsapp पर चर्चा के दौरान जो जानकारी मिली वह उत्साहवर्धक है--
Judges who appointed in Supreme court but we're district judge.
1. Justice Banumathi appointed in as district judge in 1988, then elevated to high court in 2003, then in Supreme court in 2014.
 2. Justice AM Ahmadi Appointed in Ahmadabad district court in 1964, then elevated to Gujrat high court in 1974 the in the Supreme court in 1988.
3. K. T. Thomas (Justice), 1977 dist judge, kerala, 1985 high court and 1996 supreme court.
4. Chokkalingam Nagappan, 1987 district judge, 2000 HC Madras and 2013 Supreme court
5. Justice Prafulla Chandra Pant, 1976, he qualified up pcs,j. In 1990 promoted to district judge in up. 2004 additional judge high court uttarakhand, 2008 permanent judge High Court uk, 2014 supreme court
6. Ms. Justice M. Fathima Beevi, Born on 30.4.1927 in Pathanamthitta (Kerala); Father: Mr. Meera Sahib; Family: Single, living with Mother Khadeeja Bibi. Schooling from Catholicate High School, Pathanamthitta, B.Sc. (University College, Trivandrum), B.L. (Law College, Trivandrum); Enrolled as Advocate on 14.11.1950, Appointed as Munsiff in the Kerala Sub-ordinate Judicial Services in May, 1958, Promoted as the Sub-ordinate Judge in 1968, Promoted as the Chief Judicial Magistrate in 1972, Promoted District & Sessions Judge in 1974, Appointed as the Judicial Member of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in January, 1980, Elevated to the High Court as a Judge on 4.8.1983, Became permanent Judge of the High Court on 14.3.1984.Retired as the Judge of the High Court on 29.4.1989. Elevated to the Supreme Court as a Judge on 6.10.1989....https://www.sci.gov.in/chief-justice-judges

7. Palekar, Devidas Ganpat, B.A., LL.B.-Born 4th September, 1909 in North Kanara District; Educated at Government High School, Karwar, Elphinstone College and Government Law College, Bombay. Enrolled as an Advocate of Bombay High Court on 2nd February 1934. Practised both Civil and Criminal cases on the Appellate Side of that High Court. Joined Bombay Judicial Service as Civil Judge, Junior Division, on 9th June 1939. Became Assistant Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge in September, 1949. Deputy Secretary to the State Government in Legal Department from 1954 to 1956. District Judge from August, 1956 to September, 1958. Appointed as Additional Registrar of Bombay High Court from October, 1958 and became Registrar of that High Court on 15th January 1959. Appointed as Additional Judge of the High Court at Bombay for two years from 14th October 1961. Permanent Judge from 27th August 1962. Judge, Supreme Court of India from 19th July 1971.


There are others who qualified subordinate judiciary but resigned and finally made way to the Supreme Court of India, like Swatantra Kumar

Tuesday, 13 February 2018

LAW AND ORDER VIS A VIS PUBLIC ORDER

 Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v State of Bihar (Lohia II),[1] a Constitution Bench decision held that ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ are not same thing. Just came to know about a case in which it was applied. Sharing for your kind information only. 

 In the case of Sudhir Kumar Saha v Commissioner of Police, Calcutta[2] the reason given was as under:
Every act that affects "law and order" need not affect 'public order'. If it is otherwise every one who disturbs "law and order", however petty the offence committed by him may be, can be detained under the Prevention Detention Act. This would be a total repudiation of of the rule of law and an affront to our Constitution.
In Sudhir Kumar Saha case the the petitioner was ordered to be detained by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta under s. 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950) by his order dated July 15, 1969. The detention of accused was ordered because of the three instances
i.                    on 28-2-1968 between 9-50 p.m. and 10-30 p.m. the, petitioner armed with a knife along with some others, also armed, created disturbance on the Northern Avenue in the course of which he attacked the local people with knife as a result of which one Ajit Kumar Biswas sustained stab injuries. It is further alleged that during that incident, the petitioner and his associates hurled soda water bottles and brickbats towards the local people endangering their lives and safety and thereby they created, fear and frightfulness amongst the people of the locality and thus affected public peace,and tranquillity of the locality.
ii.                  On 29-10-1968 at about 9-10 p.m. the petitioner being armed with bombs and accompanied by, some other created disturbance on Raja Manindra Road, in the course of which he and his associates hurled bombs, used swords, iron rods' and lathis against the local people.
iii.                On 28-6-1969 at about 11-15 p.m., the petitioner and his associates armed        with bombs created disturbance on Raja Manindra Road in the course of which the indiscriminately hurled bombs towards the local ;people.  
Despite three allegations on three different occasions, the accused appellant was not prosecuted.  The court held :
In the ordinary course, if there is truth in the allegations made, he should have been prosecuted and given an opportunity to defend himself. The allegations made against the petitioner do not amount to anything more, than that he committed certain breaches of law.  The detention of the petitioner under the circumstances of this case appears to be a gross misuse of the power conferred under the Preventive Detention Act…. The three incidents mentioned in the grounds are- stray incidents spread over a period of one year and four months. These incidents cannot be said to be inter-linked.    They could not, have prejudiced the maintenance of 'public order' nor can they be held to be subversive of 'public order'. They were at best prejudicial to "'law and order".     




[1] AIR  1966 SC 740: 1966 SCR  (1) 709. The Constitution Bench consisted of A.K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar And R.S. Bachawat. The judgement was split(4:1). Raghubar Dayal, J was in minority.  
[2] Decided on 18 December, 1969 by a Division Bench. Equivalent citations: 1970 AIR 814, 1970 SCR (3) 360.

Tuesday, 21 July 2015

हक मांगने के दो उदाहरण

आज दो ऐसे उदाहरण मिल गए जो असंगत प्रतीत होते हैं, और इसलिए यहाँ दे रहा हूँ क्योंकि जो असंगत है वह भी सुसंगत है-
हम मेहनतकश इस दुनिया में सब अपना हिस्सा मांगेगे, एक गाँव नहीं, एक देश नहीं, हम सारी दुनिया मांगेगे. ----


‘दो न्याय अगर तो आधा दो,
पर, इसमें भी यदि बाधा हो,
तो दे दो केवल पाँच ग्राम,
रक्खो अपनी धरती तमाम।
हम वहीं खुशी से खायेंगे,
परिजन पर असि न उठायेंगे!--
कृष्ण की चेतावनी / रामधारी सिंह "दिनकर"

Tuesday, 14 July 2015

बेटियों के बारे में सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की राय-शबनम (और सलीम ) बनाम उत्तर प्रदेश-१५ मई २०१५. पैरा २९-

29. Familial relations play a vital role in describing and highlighting the qualities of our society. The Indian legal system today does not differentiate between a son and a daughter-they have equal rights and duties. Indian culture has been witness to for centuries, that daughters dutifully bear the burden of being the caregivers for her parents, even more than a son. Our experience has reflected that an adult daughter places greater emphasis on their relationships with their parents, and when those relationships go awry, it takes a worse toll on the adult daughters than the adult sons. The modern era, led by the dawn of education, no longer recognizes the stereotype that a parent would want a son so that they have someone to look after them and support them in their old age. Now, in an educated and civilized society, a daughter plays a multifaceted and indispensible role in the family, especially towards her parents. She is a caregiver and a supporter, a gentle hand and responsible voice, an embodiment of the cherished values of our society and in whom a parent places blind faith and trust.

इस मामले में शबनम ने अपने प्रेमी के साथ मिलकर अपने पूरे परिवार (७ सदयस्य)को मार डाला था क्योंकि परिवार विवाह के विरुद्ध था. एक   दूधमुंहे शिशु का भी गला घोंट दिया ताकि संपत्ति का कोई और वारिश ना बचे. इसमें उच्चतम न्यायालय ने मृत्यु दंड दिया.

 SCC OnLine SC 492
J3http://www.scconline.com/images/searchblankPng.png
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(Before H.L Dattu, C.J and S.A Bobde and Arun Mishra, JJ.)
Criminal Appeal Nos. 802-803 of 2015
(@ S.L.(Crl.) Nos. 6520-6521 of 2013)
Shabnam .…. Appellant(s)
v.
State of U.P .…. Respondent(s)
With
Criminal Appeal Nos. 804-805 of 2015
(@ S.L.(Crl.) Nos. 6528-6529 of 2013)
Saleem .…. Appellant(s)
v.
State of U.P .…. Respondent(s)
Criminal Appeal Nos. 802-803 of 2015 (@ S.L.(Crl.) Nos. 6520-6521 of 2013) and Criminal Appeal Nos. 804-805 of 2015 (@ S.L.(Crl.) Nos. 6528-6529 of 2013)
Decided on May 15, 2015
A. Criminal Law — Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 299-304 — Culpable Homicide and Murder — Trial, Sentencing and other issues — Sentence — Death Sentence — General Principle for imposition of death Sentence — Multiple successive murders of seven persons, including her own parents brother, sister-in law and ten-month old nephew by the accused daughter with the aid of her lover, the other accused — Motive for the crime is the opposition of their alliance from the deceased family and to grab the entire property of the family — Affirming the death sentence — Held, where maximum punishment that could be awarded under a provision is death penalty, the Courts are required to independently consider facts of each case and determine a sentence which is the most appropriate and proportional to the culpability of the accused — The Court has to apply the test to determine, if it was the ‘rarest of rare’ case for imposition of a death sentence — The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be cautiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all relevant circumstances
(Paras 23 and 24)
B. Criminal Law — Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 299-304 — Culpable Homicide and Murder — Trial, Sentencing and other issues — Sentence — Death Sentence — Brutality of murder and victims — Number, Age, Helplessness of persons killed — Murder of seven persons of the family — Extreme brutal, calculated and diabolical nature of the crime — Little likelihood of reform of the accused and of their abstaining from future crime — Appellant-accused persons' preparedness, active involvement, scheming execution and subsequent conduct reeks of calculated and motivated murders — Death sentence affirmed
HEADNOTES from -
SCC OnLine SC 492

Tuesday, 20 January 2015

VARIOUS POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
THE POWER IN THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA CAN BE DIVIDED IN TWO CATAGORIES -
1. THOSE GIVEN TO VARIOUS WINGS OF STATE- FOR EXAMPLE,
--POWER GIVEN TO PARLIAMENT-LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE LAWS, CONSTITUENT POWER TO AMEND CONSTITUTION,
POWER GIVEN TO EXECUTIVE, LIKE PRESIDENT, ELECTION COMMISSION ETC,  POWER GIVEN TO JUDICIARY
2. THOSE NOT GIVEN TO ANYBODY BUT IS SAFE ONLY WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND CAN BE USED BY HIGHER JUDICIARY-FOR EXAMPLE THE POWER OF BASIC STRUCTURE THEORY.
NOW HIREARCHY OF POWER IS
1. POWER OF BASIC STRUCTURE THEORY
2. CONSTITUENT POWER
3. LEGISLATIVE POWER
4.RULE MAKING POWER