Sunday, 7 August 2022

JUDICIAL REVIEW, NATIONAL SECURITY AND SEALED COVER JURISPRUDENCE : A Comment on Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India

88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1975) 



Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India, 02.03.22 


  1. Perspective 

Free speech is the oxygen for democracy. A constitutional democracy is ‘preserved, protected and promoted’ by the power of judicial review. Judicial review shapes and makes the present as well as  the future of democracy. Security of the state is equally essential for democratic survival of the State. Liberty and security are two wheels of the chariot called democratic republic. The Supreme Court is the sarthi (pilot) of that chariot who has to navigate it in the direction mapped in the Preamble of the constitution of India. 

The sarthi has to move the chariot in the highway to protect fundamental rights of citizens. It has to be fast and swift against the arbitrary decisions of the State. But every highway has some signboard, like go slow -school ahead, sharp turn etc. While exercising its power of judicial review the Supreme court is required to take note of these signboards. In the constitutional vocabulary these sign boards come in various forms where the judiciary has to follow the policy of “go slow”. One such sign board is “national security”. As national security is not a licence for the State to take any decision, judicial review is not a licence to determine every aspect of executive discretion. It is desirable to make a quick glance over what is judicial review?

IA. Judicial review 

The power of judicial review has remained a contentious issue in the area of constitutional

and administrative law. The constitutional pundits have insisted that “decision” and

“decision making process” are two distinct matters and identified this as a “distinction

with difference”. Should the judiciary examine the “decision making process” of the State

or should it also evaluate the “decision”  made by the State after the decision making

process. Former is the classical role of “judicial review” and later is called “merit review”.

In the case of Centre For PIL v.  Union of India (2011) 4 SCC 1 (also called as PJ Thomas judgement or Institutional integrity judgement) the full bench reiterated the principle as under:  

Government is not accountable to the courts in respect of policy decisions. However, they are accountable for the legality of such decisions. While deciding

this case, we must keep in mind the  difference between legality and merits, also between judicial review and merit review. [emphasis added] 

The Supreme Court highlighted two points in PJ Thomas which can be explained as (i) policy decisions are government domain. (ii) Legality and desirability are two different matters. Legality can be decided in court but desirability will be decided by the executive or the Parliament. When a court decides on legality, it is judicial review. When it has to decide on desirability, it is merit review. Merit review is permissible in cases of violation of pure fundamental rights, public laws.  Is the role of judicial review restricted in case of contractual transactions? Is it further restricted if the contractual matter is related to national security, defence and foreign policy? The Rafale judgement and many others have answers both the questions in “yes.” It is a restatement and reiteration of the classical role of judicial review established all over the world.

The case Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India, (decided on March 2, 2022) needs to be appreciated in the above background.  


  1. Facts

Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited runs a news and current affairs TV channel by the name of Media One. “The channel is reportedly backed by the Kerala unit of Jamaat-e-Islami, a socio-religious political organisation that was declared “unlawful” by the Centre for five years in 2019.” The Union government has issued a show cause notice on Jan 5, 2022 that in “consideration of national security and public order, the Government intends to revoke the licence / permission granted to the petitioner Company”. Mediaone responded that (a) no reasons are given as to how national security and public order concerns have been raised by their channel. (b) Mediaone ought to be given hearing before any adverse decision. The channel challenged the decision of the government in the High court which upheld the order of the Government of India to ban the channel. The reasoning of the high court was  (a) that in the matters of national security the rule of natural justice is not always mandatory. (b) the executive is the sole judge in national security cases because ultimately the executive will be responsible for it.  The matter came to the Supreme court.  


  1. Issues 

The Supreme court considered two issues-- 

  1. Whether the confidential files of the government which were shared in sealed files with the high court  (and the Supreme court)contain something substantial that deals with national security.  In terms of article 19(2) does it “imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by article 19(1)(a) in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India”? Is sufficiency of such material judicially reviewable?   

  2. “Whether the contents of the files should be disclosed to the petitioners in order to enable them to effectively pursue their challenge?” Or does the rule of fair hearing is applicable in this case where national security concern has been raised. 


IV. Decision of Court 


a. Issue 1

The Supreme court held against the State. An interim stay was granted against the Government order to ban the channel. The rationale of the Supreme Court was that the content of sealed files do not throw light on what are national security concerns and therefore, the restrictions do not seem “reasonable”. There were two grounds for this inference (i) the observation of the High court that “the nature, impact, gravity and depth of the issue is not discernible from the files” and “too many details are not available in the files”. Still the High court relied on national security, public order arguments of the State. (ii) The Supreme Court also perused the files (in sealed cover) and after “due regard to the contents of the files” reached to the conclusion that a case for interim relief was made out. 

In other words the content of the sealed cover did not repose much confidence in the division bench of the Supreme Court. While the High court chose “security” over “liberty” the Supreme court did reverse. Is a “searching inquiry into the persuasiveness of the government's   justifications consistent with the established jurisprudence? If the executive gave a “facially legitimate and bonafide” reason for its action, the Court  “will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification” against the asserted constitutional interests of citizens. This is because of the norm of “deferential treatment”  or “respect for the political branches” accorded to the Executive especially in the realm of national security. (Trump v. Hawaii, USSC-2018).  


b. Issue 2

The second issue of whether the content of files should or should not be shared with the channel? The written law on sealed cover is in the Supreme Court Rules 2013, Order XIII clause 7 which is cover as under:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in this order, no party or person shall be entitled as of right to receive copies of or extracts from any minutes, letter or document of any confidential nature or any paper sent, filed or produced, which the Chief Justice or the Court directs to keep in sealed cover or considers to be of confidential nature or the publication of which is considered to be not in the interest of the public, except under and in accordance with an order specially made by the Chief Justice or by the Court." [LLM students of ILI(2023-24), Anjali, Ginni and Govinda brought this provision to my notice]



The question remained open for final disposal where the trend of sealed cover jurisprudence. The Supreme Court decided it on April 5, 2023 in Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India. The Court decided in favour of Madhyam. It directed the Government of India to issue renewal licence. This was a “hard case” [Pl see "Hard Cases" by Ronald Dwarkin, 1975] for the Supreme Court of India. What is also important is that this was a case under article 136 and not under art 32. In the debate between security and liberty, liberty won.


V. Comments 

The scope of judicial review in the case of national security is extremely limited because national security is basically a policy question. Various jurisdictions all over the world have addressed it with one common thread, ie restricted power of judicial review, deference to executive. Here we may discuss two countries from common law jurisdictions, ie UK and USA. 


  1. UK : Judicial Review and National Security 

   If we take clues from the UK, in the case of Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763 it was held that “the question of whether something is "in the interests" of national security is not a question of law. It is a matter of judgment and policy. Under the constitution of the United Kingdom and most other countries, decisions as to whether something is or is not in the interests of national security are not a matter for judicial decision. They are entrusted to the executive.” 

 The appellants were activists for nuclear disarmament. They entered into a prohibited area (R.A.F. station at Wethersfield) with the intention to express their protest against nuclear arm policy. They were prosecuted for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. They were convicted. 

They argued that nuclear bomb can harm the country itself and the state would be much safer without them. The House of Lords held that the desirability of a nuclear bomb and safety of State is a purely executive matter and a court cannot question it.  

The court also osd that “What is meant by "national security" is a question of construction and therefore a question of law within the jurisdiction of the Commission, subject to appeal. But there is no difficulty about what "national security" means. It is the security of the United Kingdom and its people.” 

Another famous case is the Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 AC 374, the House of Lords (also called as GCHQ case) The high court of Kerala Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited  has referred to this persuasive precedent.


Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is a British intelligence agency. The British Government (Margret Thatcher) issued a royal prerogative and banned the employees of the GCHQ to join any trade union on the grounds of national security. The GCHQ raised an objection that the ban denied the legitimate expectation of the right to collective bargain for fair wages through trade unions. The British government argued that royal prerogatives are beyond judicial review and national security reasons are exceptions legitimises such a bar on unionism.  The House of lords held that royal prerogatives can be reviewed by the judiciary. It was the first time the Court held like this. The nature of power and not the source (royal) is decisive. However there are certain exceptions and national security is one of them. Lord Diplock observed that “the judicial process is totally inept to deal with the sort of problems [national security] which it involves.” However, that does not mean national security by default is beyond judicial review.    


 In Council of Civil Service Union it was observed as under: 

The decision on whether the requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness in any particular case is for the Government and not for the courts; the Government alone has access to the necessary information, and in any event the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security. But, if the decision is successfully challenged, on the ground that it has been reached by a process which is unfair, then the Government is under an obligation to produce evidence that the decision was in fact based on grounds of national security. 


The principles of administrative law and The Council of Civil Service Union  makes following points for guidance --

  1. Fairness in decision making by the government is essential but there can be certain things that “outweigh the duty of fairness in any particular case”. Rules of fairness and natural justice are not absolute and can be compromised. 

    1. There can be certain exceptions to the requirement of established rules of fairness. In those exceptional cases notice and hearing etc can be avoided. 

    2. Who will decide the exceptions

      1. The Parliament will decide by law 

      2. The Court can decide by adjudicatory process

      3. The executive will decide In certain cases like national security, and not the court because of two reasons 

        1. The necessary information as to national security is with the executive only 

        2. The necessary training as to national security is with the executives only. The judiciary is not trained and equipped to decide on national security matters. This is something like an army officer who is not trained in law has to decide complex constitutional questions. 

    3. In case the issue of unfairness in the process (not decision) is established by the petitioner (which is very difficult and therefore only manifest arbitrariness can be established) then the government has to produce evidence as to the ground of national security. 

In other words, in case of national security the scope of judicial review is restricted. The petitioner must establish that the procedure was unfair, i.e. manifestly unfair. Government needs only to plead national security and no evidence of national security is required. If the petitioner establishes the procedural unfairness, then only evidence of national security is required. 


In Secy of State for Home Deptt. v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47 the Court held that the confidential information on national security cannot be examined or shared. 

Rehman was a Pakistani national whose parents, wife and children were British citizens. He wanted to stay in England for an indefinite period. The government officials declined “on the basis of the information he has received from confidential sources, that you are involved with an Islamic terrorist organisation Markaz Dawa Al Irshad (MDI). He is satisfied that in the light of your association with the MDI it is undesirable to permit you to remain and that your continued presence in this country represents a danger to national security.” The court favoured the State. 

The UK government also mentioned as under : 

[though] Rehman and his United Kingdom-based followers are unlikely to carry out any acts of violence in this country, his activities directly support terrorism in the Indian subcontinent and are likely to continue unless he is deported. Ur Rehman has also been partly responsible for an increase in the number of Muslims in the United Kingdom who have undergone some form of militant training, including indoctrination into extremist beliefs and at least some basic weapons training. The Security Service is concerned that the presence of returned jihad trainees in the United Kingdom may encourage the radicalisation of the British Muslim community. His activities in the United Kingdom are intended to further the cause of a terrorist organisation abroad. For this reason, the Secretary of State considers both that Ur Rehman poses a threat to national security and that he should be deported from the United Kingdom on [the] grounds that his presence here is not conducive to the public good for reasons of national security.

In other words even if there is no threat through the acts of violence, Rahman is still a threat because hHis activities directly support terrorism in the Indian subcontinent, (and not in the UK)


The Court observed: 

I accept that there must be a real possibility of an adverse affect on the United Kingdom for what is done by the individual under inquiry but I do not accept that it has to be direct or immediate. Whether there is such a real possibility is a matter which has to be weighed up by the Secretary of State and balanced against the possible injustice to that individual if a deportation order is made.


There is a very large element of policy in this which is, as I have said, primarily for the Secretary of State. This is an area where it seems to me particularly that the Secretary of State can claim that a preventative or precautionary action is justified. If an act is capable of creating indirectly a real possibility of harm to national security it is in principle wrong to say that the state must wait until action is taken which has a direct effect against the United Kingdom.

    18. National security and defence of the realm may cover the same ground though I tend to think that the latter is capable of a wider meaning. But if they are the same then I would accept that defence of the realm may justify action to prevent indirect and subsequent threats to the safety of the realm.

    19. The United Kingdom is not obliged to harbour a terrorist who is currently taking action against some other state (or even in relation to a contested area of land claimed by another state) if that other state could realistically be seen by the Secretary of State as likely to take action against the United Kingdom and its citizens.

The Rahman case establishes that the right to access family, though a very important right to life, cannot be invoked and national security is paramount. Also the threat to England, or any direct threat is not essential. 

B. USA : National security and judicial review 


There are good resources from the US jurisdiction also. FBI v. Fazaga, (March 4, 2022). 

In 2006-07 the FBI sent a paid informant to Orange County, California to find the radicalised Islamic elements. He posed as a convert to Islam, went to “some  of the largest, most diverse mosques”, gathered various details (phone number, E mail, political orientation etc)  of hundreds of Muslim Americans. “He also video-recorded sensitive locations, including mosques, homes, and businesses using a hidden camera. His FBI handlers told him they were conducting electronic surveillance in at least eight area mosques.” Due to his suspicious activities, someone reported to the officers.  Three muslim citizens went to court that the conduct of FBI was religiously biased and the surveillance, data collection was made because they were muslims. 

The applicant challenged the surveillance order on the basis of fundamental rights because “Government’s unlawful information-gathering operation violated their rights under the Establishment Clause; the Free Exercise Clause; the Fourth Amendment; the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause of the US Constitution. The US Supreme court declined any such right. The US Supreme Court unanimously held that the “disclosure of counter-intelligence information that was vital to an evaluation of those claims would threaten national-security interests.” 

“The AG formally claimed state privilege. “This claim applied to the following categories of information: information that could “confirm or deny whether a particular individual was or was not the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation,” information that could reveal the “initial reasons” for or the “status and results” of an “FBI counterterrorism investigation,” and information that could reveal the “sources and methods” used in such an investigation.” FBI filed a public declaration explaining why disclosure “reasonably could be expected to cause significant harm to national security,” 

The US Supreme court upheld the non disclosure. 

 In the case of United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) a military aircraft on a flight to test secret electronic equipment crashed and certain civilian observers aboard were killed. For a claim under tort certain information was sought by the claimant as to the military flight. The State argued "Claim of Privilege". The US Supreme Court accepted the claim and declined to give any order to disclose the information. 

“Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect, while a complete abandonment of judicial control would lead to intolerable abuses.” 


There are many such cases across various jurisdictions which have established national security jurisprudence. Basic features of these precedents are that in the matters of national security, the scope of judicial review is limited. However, whether these cases provide strong persuasive ground in India or not depends on whether facts and context match or not. For example, In Chandler, the accused entered a prohibited place to support nuclear disarmament. Council of Civil Service Union was a case of the right to join a trade union. Rehman was a case where the he was denied stay in the UK on the confidential information that he “his activities directly support terrorism in the Indian subcontinent” and is involved with Islamic terrorist organisation. All his family members were UK citizens. Above three cases were not about free speech or press. Moreover, the UK does not recognise fundamental rights like India. Fazaga was a case on privacy and the aggrieved did not face any adverse consequences. Reynolds was a case on tort and the claimant was alone. In these cases the issue of fairness due to non disclosure of confidential information was in question and the courts declined to follow the rule of fairness. Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited is a case on free speech, freedom of press (news channel) as well as rights of hundreds of employees of the channel. It seems the division bench of the Supreme Court had in mind these considerations that the Court favoured “liberty” over “security”. However, the national security concerns of India are the most significant point for now because we are the most vulnerable target of terrorism. The role and reach of news channels has transformed. News channels are not limited to home only but are in the cell phone also. They are available on social media sites like youtube, facebook and a news video can be forwarded through whatsapp. Indeed there is no need to subscribe to a news channel. The growth of social media, media market, Television Rating Point (TRP), global presence, huge investment, the desire of quick commercial returns and the wish to act as a pressure group exert every day pressure on the news channel and their stakeholders. They intentionally or inadvertently cross the lakshman rekha. One irresponsible news video has the potential to radicalise youth. One glorification of killing the innocent is fodder for extremist tendencies. One justification for a terrorist attack gives voice to anti India tendencies. Half baked information, motivated news items in the name of freedom of speech and expression or fair criticism may not be hit by criminality but are inappropriate. While the government should come with prima facie evidence against the channels, the Supreme Court should not interfere unless the State action is manifestly arbitrary and “masquerades behind a facade of national-security concerns.” If the judiciary interferes without strong reasons in national security cases as to the sufficiency of the materials used for confidential decisions, the executive will begin taking the formal route of “state privileges” because it is the executive that is responsible for the “security” of India and their institutions and the individuals. Security is the precondition for any form of liberty. The Government of India is following a zero tolerance policy against security threats for which sealed cover jurisprudence is a temporary measure. Judiciary must allow the government to pursue it.   




Wednesday, 16 June 2021

NATASHA NARWAL CASE (DELHI RIOTS BAIL JUDGEMENT) : LESSONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT, THE PROTESTERS AND THE COURT

 

NATASHA NARWAL v. STATE OF DELHI Nct, 15 June 2021 (Bail judgement on Delhi riot)

Anurag deep, Associate Professor, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi 

  1. Opening Comments

  2. Natasha Narwhal judgement -content and annexure

  1. Was the alleged conduct of the accused constitutionality guaranteed? 

  2. Screenshots and evidence of Riots

  1. Concluding comments 

  1. Who is abuser of law: Both (State and Protesters)

  2. Wrong use of National security laws : remedies




  1. Opening Comments


Since December 2019 a protest against the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 emerged in various parts of India. Delhi was the center of it. In Feb 2020 there was a riot in Delhi in which more than 50 persons were killed, including police officers. Government and private properties were damaged on a large scale. This all was committed when the US President Donald Trump was in India. Besides FIR under IPC, UAPA 1967 (a counter terror legislation) was also imposed on various accused. The accused include various students from JNU, Jamia etc. They were arrested in May 2020, after around three months of registration of FIR. The accused applied for bail for accusation under IPC as well as  UAPA 1967. There was all possibilities to get bail under IPC because after a certain period 60/90 days of custody bail has to be granted (default bail). However, under  UAPA 1967 the granting of bail is very difficult because of special provision under section 43D(5) which restricts the power of court. “Jail is the rule and bail is the exception” is the jurisprudence because of strict provision of bail under counter terror laws. Before the time of default bail (the period of custody after which the accused can demand bail as a matter of right) under UAPA (ie 90/180 days) the prosecution submitted the chargesheet in September 2020. After submission of chargesheet the chance of default bail was neutralised. The Court has to exercise discretion based on the evidences placed in the chrgesheet under law.

It was alleged by the accused that 

  1. The government has arrested the protestors because it wanted to suppress dissenting voices against the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019. The accused were well known hardcore protestors of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019. 

  2. The government has wrongfully slapped UAPA 1967. The protest was peaceful though it led to violence and many deaths. It could be a case under section 34/ 302/ 120B/ 149/ 107 etc but cannot be a case under counter terror legislation.  

The division bench of the high court of Delhi, (Anup Jairam Bhambhani J. [author] and Siddharth Mridul J.) have accepted the second plea and granted them bail. Regarding first plea the high court has made a couple of remarks on the application of UAPA 1967 which shows 

  1. that the functioning of the prosecution department is weak 

  2. they are unaware of the philosophy of counter terror legislations 

  3. this case may be an illustration of misuse of UAPA 1967 

  4. the government is using UAPA 1967 to suppress peaceful dissent. 

Above statements (a) (b) (c) are agreeable. But the fourth statement (d) is difficult to digest if any one gives a glance over the screenshots attached to the judgement. Is there any prima facie evidence under UAPA 1967 -The answer is strong No. 

Is there any prima facie evidence under IPC -The answer is a strong Yes. 

II. Natasha Narwhal judgement -content and annexure 

The judgement may be divided into two parts. First part is the judgement itself. Second part is the documents (screenshots) attached. Both take almost equal space in pages.  The judgement and comment may be discussed as under-

  1. The bail judgement deals with the principles of law under UAPA 1967. It has a precedential reference of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602 and decisions like Sanjay Dutta case (1994) 5 SCC 410 besides other cases. The high court rightly concluded that a terrorist activity is an abnormal activity. It is distinct from general criminal activities. The State must take note that this difference ought to be the controlling factor when UAPA 1967 is applied. The test is, whether the alleged conduct cannot be dealt with classical criminal law? Is it really necessary to impose the provisions of counter terror legislations?

  2. The emphasis on the difference between a criminal conduct and a terrorist conduct reminds me of the case of Ram Manohar Lohia (1966). In this case the constitution bench held that law and order is a big circle. Public order is a smaller circle in that big circle. Security of State is the smallest circle. We may add that the defence of India (challenge to sovereignty and integrity of India) will be more restricted than Security of State. In other words the evidence required for restricting a conduct on the ground of the security of India should be more compelling and convincing. 




C. The judgement explains the scope of the right to protest. The high court rightly pointed out that the protest may be for a right cause or a wrong cause. The protest, “whether it is justified or unjustified” is not relevant.  Every protest, irrespective of its good or bad purposes, needs protection provided it does not breach the constitutional contours of reasonable restrictions. A protest may be noisy, may be disorderly (or likely to be disorderly) or may be violent (or likely to be disorderly)). Penal law runs into motion if the protest has a tendency of violence or disorder. The high court relied on two principles, security vis a vis liberty. The high court concluded that the evidences do not show that security was disturbed to the highest degree and that a provision of counter terror legislation should be imposed because the conduct of the accused has no proximate connection with terrorist activities, or other connected offences. No prima facie case is established as required under the provision of bail [43D(5)] under UAPA 1967.  Therefore, the general law of bail (as under section 439 CrPC) has to be applied and not the special law of UAPA 1967. Based on evidence presented in the chargesheet the high court found that the evidence of incitement of violence is also confusing, what to talk about any offence under UAPA 1967.  

The high court in Natasha Narwal was of the view that the dissenting conduct seemed to be confused with terrorist conduct. As this statement has wide nuances it may be reproduced as under: 

36. We are constrained to express, that it seems, that in its anxiety to suppress dissent, in the mind of the State, the line between the constitutionally guaranteed right to protest and terrorist activity seems to be getting somewhat blurred. If this mindset gains traction, it would be a sad day for democracy.


This statement of the Delhi HC has attracted headlines. Many have celebrated it out of context. This gives an impression that the accused were peaceful protestors. They were only engaged in galvanising support against CVV/NRC. This was lawful and protected by the constitution. The impression of the statement by the HC also goes like the actus reus of accused was limited to chakka jam which may be little unlawful but not undemocratic. This needs to be investigated in detail.

Was the alleged conduct of accused constitutionality guaranteed? 

Based on above rationale (that UAPA was not the correct law probably) the high court granted bail to the accused, and rightly so. However, this statement of the court is little generalised and seems to be made out of context. It gives an impression that the accused were exercising their “constitutionally guaranteed right to protest.” While the government failed to apply its mind properly before imposing UAPA 1967, it is not correct to state that the protestors were exercising their constitutionally guaranteed rights which can be established by reading the second part of the judgement.       

The second part of the judgement comprises relevant screenshots from the chargesheet. The screenshots establishes two things 

  1. that there is no evidence to proceed under UAPA 1967. Bail is rightly granted. Indeed the charges under UAPA 1967 cannot be framed. Chargesheet under UAPA 1967 will be quashed. It  is reported that the Police are thinking of filing an appeal. It is difficult to state what are the grounds of appeal because the screenshots do not indicate the Police has clinching evidence to establish a prima facie case under UAPA 1967. 

  2. there is enough evidence to proceed under IPC. If the prosecution is able to establish the evidence that is presented in the chargesheet, it will lead to conviction of the accused. In appeal the Police may argue in the Supreme court that bail granted for offences under IPC are not well founded. The accused may influence witnesses because the accused are not only influential but can resort to scary/ violent tricks to intimidate the eye witnesses. Unless the Police has some additional evidence, it is not likely that the Supreme court will honour the request of the Police. The chances to get a stay on bail order of the high court are not good.  

Screenshots and evidence of Riots

The screenshots contain the statements of many eye witnesses. They are primary evidence and have strong probative force. If the chargesheet is read, it makes serious allegations. The eyewitness of various connected transactions make statement as under--

  1. The accused students (who were granted bail in this case) were a part of a group which was planning a huge protest with the purpose that it would result in riot and violence. Certain persons of the group which they belonged was insisting केवल भाषण से काम नहीं चलेगा। खून बहाना पड़ेगा. लाल मिर्च, अंडे, एसिड बोतल लेकर आओ.(1434) [statement of a witness]. The eyewitness is a person whose job seems to be to make arrangements for tea, chairs etc for the leaders of protesters. [screnshot-2]

  2. screen stot-3b --ये चक्का जाम हिन्दुओं की आबादी में करेंगे, जब हिन्दू घिर जाएंगे तो वहां तुरंत पथराव कर देंगे, फिर दंगे भड़क जाएंगे. चिल्ली पाउडर, एसिड, कांच की खाली बोतल, डंडे, पत्थर अभी से जमा  करो ताकि दंगे में काम आ सके.  (1554) [statement of a witness]

  3. On 23-24 Jan 2020 a meeting was arranged. It was attended by the accused, (Natasha Narwal and Devangana Kalita). A person (A1) was saying that the protest should ultimately escalate to riot and should result in spilling of bloods of policemen and others. This is the only possible means to bring the government on knees. A1 directed the accused person to induce local women of Seemapuri to keep stockpiling knives, bottles, acid, stones, chilli powder, other dangerous articles to be used in rioting…(screen shot-5); [statement of a witness]

  4. Screenshot 7--16/17 फरवरी की रात प्रोटेस्ट साइट पर एक सीक्रेट मीटिंग बुलाई गई, जिसको देवांगना, नताशा ने अटेंड किया. इस मीटिंग में प्रोटेस्ट और दंगों की बात की गई थी जिसपर सब सहमत थे. उसने मेरी मुलाकात देवांगना, नताशा से कराइ. मुझे पता चला कि इन लोगों ने डंडे, पत्थर, और लाल मिर्च इकठा करने की शुरुआत करी. और लोगों से बोलै कि ये सब इकठ्ठा करे. (1964). [statement of a witness]

  5. Screenshot 24 - इसी दौरान [मालूम] चला कि नताशा, देवांगना, और पिंजरा तोड़ के अन्य सदस्य २६ जनवरी से घूम घूम कर औरतों को पत्थर, कटीले तारों वाले डंडे, खाली बोतलें, एसिड की बोतलें, लोहे की रोड, लाल मिर्च पाउडर, जमा करने के लिए कह रही हैं.

  6. Screenshot 25-26-मैंने ग्रुप में यह भी लिखा कि अगर प्रोटेस्ट पीसफुल है तो नताशा व उनके साथी चिल्ली पावडर क्यों बाँट रहे हैं, इस पर A 2  ने व्हाट्सप्प काल कर धमकी दी कि ग्रुप पर मुहँ तो नहीं खोला, कौम से गद्दारी मत करना वार्ना बचेगा नहीं. [statement of a witness]

  7. Screenshot 27 --देवांगना, नताशा मौजूद थे. लोगों को तेजाब इकठा करने को बोला गया. 

  8. Screenshot 31 ---समय करीब ७ बजे शाम मैंने आगे बढ़कर मौजपुर मेट्रो स्टेशन पर देखा कि देवांगना, नताशा बुर्के वाली लेडिस को पत्थर, बोतलें, और मिर्च पाउडर के पैकेट बाँट रही हैं, बुर्के वाली लेडिस CAA समर्थकों पर फेंक रही हैं. 

  9. Screenshot 36 --उनके साथ ही देवांगना, नताशा नरवाल, जिनके बारे में मुझे पता लगा कि पिंजरा तोड़ नाम की पार्टी से हैं, भी वहां आकर बैठने लगे. इन मीटिंग्स में देश विरोधी नारे और भीड़ को कैसे हिंसक बनाया जाए इसपर चर्चा होती थी. कैसे  सड़कों को जाम किया जाए जिससे दूसरी कम्युनिटी के लोग परेशां हो जाएँ और कुछ हरकत करे जो दंगे को भड़काने के काम आएगी. 


III. Concluding Remarks 

Can these statements be called a legitimate exercise of dissent? Is talking about disorder, instigation of collection of acid, bottles, chilli powder etc and their distribution constitutionally protected right to dissent? The feeling of the high court that the government seems to be misusing UAPA 1967 is correct. It is also correct that there was no prima facie evidence of application of UAPA 1967. But considering the alleged conduct of the accused as constitutionality protected form of dissent is patronising the conduct of accused against whom there is prima facie evidence of inciting disorder and violence. The High court should reconsider its statement and reframe it because such statements will be used at various national and international forums. This reminds the minority opinion of Chandrachud, J. in Romila Thapar case (28 Sept 2018) where he observed as under:


"Dissent is a symbol of a vibrant democracy. Voices in opposition cannot be muzzled by persecuting those who take up unpopular causes. Where, however, the expression of dissent enters upon the prohibited field of an incitement to violence or the subversion of a democratically elected government by recourse to unlawful means, the dissent ceases to be a mere expression of opinion. Unlawful activities which violate the law have to be dealt with in accordance with it."  

The screen shots establishes (prima facie)that the expression of dissent by accused entered "upon the prohibited field of an incitement to violence." More than one eyewitness statements specifically mention that the accused were active participants in the meetings where "subversion of a democratically elected government by recourse to unlawful means" was openly promoted. Indeed some who were present in the meeting have opposed the idea of violence, planning of riot. They were threatened of dire consequences (though not by the accused but their active friends which links a conspiracy angle where the accused could be involved). The HC missed the point that dissent ceases to be mere expression of opinion when it has tendency of violence or disorder. "Unlawful activities which violate the law have to be dealt with in accordance with it." Therefore the HC Delhi has committed a mistake in making these statements in a matter where more than 50 persons were killed, properties worth crores was damaged, and the reputation of Indian State was demolished in the time when US President was in Delhi.

  1. Who is abuser of law: Both (State and Protesters)

The Government as well as  the accused both abused their position. The Government  abused its authority and power while the protestors (accused) abused their right to free speech. The imposition of UAPA 1967 establishes that the government did not do its homework well.  It might have used this law to convey a signal that if protest becomes violent, zero tolerance will be the policy even in those cases which can be dealt with the classical criminal laws.  

The screenshot establishes that the protestors abused their freedom of speech and expression as well as  their right to protest. It is a lesson for both. What worries me is the allegations against the students of higher education. Though the allegations under IPC (planning a peaceful protest but actually executing a violent protest with the purpose of riot among Hindu Muslims) are yet to be established, the screenshots and the statements of witnesses demonstrate a disturbing story. If they are correct, it is a big question mark on academic institutions, its socio-political environment. How do students get this much time to plan a violent protest? What is the role of academic fraternity in such situations? What are we academicians teaching and doing on the campuses?     

Wrong use of National security laws : remedies

The wrong use of UAPA 1967 or counter terror legislations is not something new. It may be due to negligent conduct of the government officials or can be a part of a deliberate design to deal with the opponents. The government knew that they had no evidence to establish UAPA 1967 but they continued with it so that the accused stay in jail for a reasonable period. How to check such misuse?  The government cannot take action because it is a party to the wrong decision. In Nambi Narayanan case (March 2018), the Supreme court has ordered to fix responsibility for wrongful arrest. But the Kerala government has declined to take any action under one or other pretext. Ultimately the Supreme Court has ordered the CBI to do the needful based on the reports of a fact finding committee headed by a former Supreme court judge. The case of Natasha Narwal is different. It is not a case of wrongful arrest. And unlike Nambi Narayanan (where misuse of legal and judicial process was established beyond reasonable doubts by the Supreme court), Natasha Narwal is at the initial stage. However, based on the screenshots available with the Delhi high court judgement, I will treat it a case of wrongful imposition of UAPA 1967 though a conclusive judicial finding is yet to be done.  On the reform side this author has proposed in his previous writings (See case comments in the Indian Law Institute News Letter): 

  1. Can the high court be a little more active in fixing the responsibility of such negligence or deliberate design? It may ask the legal department of the government if they are aware of the difference between a criminal activity and a terrorist activity? Are they conscious of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur's decision? The court can ask the officials responsible for it to go for a refresher course or training programme to understand the basics. A similar order was made in State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai, (2014) though it was at acquittal stage.  

  2. Secondly, can the high court ask the government to submit a compensation amount in the High court registry? The grant of such compensation can be made to the accused once the case is conclusively decided in their favour. The accused were charged under IPC as well as  UAPA 1967. They had to stay in jail for a longer period because of UAPA 1967. Wrong imposition of UAPA 1967 was against the “procedure established by law” because it was unfair, unjust and unreasonable. There was hardly any evidence which could connect the accused to terror activities. This was violative of personal liberty under article 21. A constitutional tort was committed. For constitutional tort compensation can be granted. It has been granted in many cases of misuse of power by the State. However, the judicial approach is very conservative. In the case of Akshardham Attack, the Supreme court declined to grant any compensation though another bench of the Supreme court has reached a finding that the accused of Akshardham Attack were falsely implicated. If an honourable acquittal does not deserve compensation under constitutional tort, it is very difficult to argue for compensation in Natasha Narwal case which is still at pre-trial stage. 

[THANKS TO -Pranshu, Kartikey, Sidhartha [LLM-pursuing(2020-21),ILI] for significant suggestion]