Thursday, 7 February 2019

JUSTICE BY THE MOB-PRESUMPTION OF GUILT-HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN-AN INCIDENT AT METRO STATION PICK POCKET


“He looks like a pickpocket…”

It was February  6, 2019 around 8pm at Vaishali Metro Station, Ghaziabad. I was coming out of the metro train and moving downstairs when some halla gulla attracted me. I saw a young boy of 18 or 20 years old, in very simple clothing, being questioned by three or four passengers on the way to the stairs. They were accusing the boy of attempting to pickpocket. The boy was aggressively denying their accusations. There was an exchange of abusive words. Then, another young passenger in his 20s slapped him.
The boy fell down and started weeping, saying “I have not attempted any theft”. Meanwhile, two others also used their hands and one grabbed his collar. I intervened and requested them to not beat him.
When they ignored me, I enhanced my pitch, changed my tone, and told them, “You complain to the police; I will go with you to lodge an FIR. But you dont have any authority to beat a person”. The victim, here the alleged pickpocket, was showing reluctance to go to the police downstairs. He said that he had to catch the Metro train and he had done nothing. Upon further insistence by me, he was almost dragged to the Metro office by the mob, while I followed them When I entered the office, I found that none of the complainants was there. Those persons, at least four, who had been accusing the young boy had disappeared. I called for them twice, loudly, but failed to locate any of them.

Two police men were with me. They said, “Sir, yahee hota hai, log complaint nahee karte kai baar.”
Inside the metro office, the young boy (alleged pickpocket) was being questioned by many, including the metro staff, passengers, police, and a person who informed that he belonged to crime branch. Everyone was asking the same question, “Sach bata, kya kar raha tha.”
The young boy folded his hands, crying. “Mai to Metro se ja raha tha”.
A person interrogated, “Kahan ja raha tha, kahan ka roman hai.”

The young boy was not able to recall the destination for which he had bought the token. He replied, “30 rupaye ka token liya hai aur…”

A person took his token to discover his destination. Others were asking his name and address and repeatedly accusing him of being a pick pocket. They insisted that people like him have become a menace in the whole Metro station and train. “Char danda maariye, sab ugal dega,” they suggested.

Meanwhile, one person claiming to be from the crime branch declared that the boy was a drug addict. “Sir, hamara to roj ka kaam hai, dekhte hee pahchan jate hain.”

A metro staff member had questions and confident assumptions of his own. Kahan rahta hai? Aree sir, ye aadatee apradhee hai, main doosree baar ise dekh raha hun. Abhee ek metro station par pakde gaye hain do log. Ye usee gang ka hai.”
My advice to him was simple. ”If you know he has previously pickpocketed and is a man of that gang, please lodge a case. Otherwise allow him to go.”

“Aise kaise jaane de?” Was the baffled response.

I informed them that they could not detain a person. The present police could, but even they did not have the authority to detain him for a long duration. On being told by a staff member that he was a “suspect”, my response was, “All those who alleged that he had attempted to pickpocket are not here. Neither you, nor any other person, was there. I was there but I saw he was being beaten by two or three fellow passengers. Now, you can institute a case or let him go.”

The staff member was scornful. “Aapko kanoon pata hai…” a half statement, half question.

“Mujhe toh pata hai, kya aapko pata hai?” I calmly responded. I insisted that the truth would be discovered based on the CCTV footage. The police could enquire further or, given that the boy had a token, allow him to go. I asked him to keep some ID in the future. He looked at me with gratitude, aware that I was the only person protecting him from this impromptu Kangaroo Court.
I refused to leave him to the mercy of the mob and continued to insist that he be allowed to leave, and finally, he was. The mob had branded him as an “accused”. A couple of its passengers had beat him up. And all of them had concluded that he was the pick pocket. How quick we are in judging a person if his clothes are simple, his hair uncombed, his etiquette uncouth and his looks rustic! Yes, there might have been reason to suspect him. He had no ID. He claimed to be 16 years old when he easily looked like he was over 18. He could not recall the name of his destination. However, all of these could be explained through other reasons, without jumping to conclusions.

This is but one illustration of the unholy thinking of mob justice and quick justice, that too when there are only allegations of attempt and the police is easily approachable in metro stations. This is an illustration of rule of mob, or rule by men, and not rule of law. This is an illustration of violation of human rights not by state by but by other human beings. The passengers firmly believed that the accused should be punished immediately. I wish to ask these people, “Let us suppose that you are driving a bike or a car which hits a child and kills her. Should people beat you? In this case, it is certain you hit the child. You may not be at fault. No over speeding, no red light jumping. It was purely by chance that the child came on the road. But people will presume that you are at fault. The law sometimes also factually presumes that a driver holds additional responsibility vis-a-vis a pedestrian. Should you be taken to the police, or should the parents of the child and other passersby strike your face with their hands and fists? A person who is poor and weaker is always a suspect, be s/he a domestic servant, a driver, a waiter, a rickshaw puller, or a pavement dweller. We need to banish this mentality. As far as those who take the law into their hands are concerned, they should be accordingly warned under CrPC 1973 (security for good conduct) and may also be prosecuted under the Indian Penal Code. In this case, the young man was alleged to commit attempt to pickpocket and he was beaten and dragged. Even if he is an accused who was caught red handed or a convicted criminal, the rule of law prevails. The reaction of a victim of pickpocketing may be natural, a concerned citizen may be worried by the rising incidents of pickpocketing in metro stations and trains, a passerby may want to help deliver justice and a metro staff member may want to check this menace of pickpockets. The purpose is pious and end is excellent. Nevertheless, the means used, like presuming someone is a thief based on stereotypes associated with his or her dressing sense, hair, skin colour, or even facial features, and then taking the law into one’s own hands goes against the law and human rights. The minimum requirement of human rights needs to be followed without any exception.

The responsibility of an intellectual citizen, or one conscious of his or her “fundamental duty”, is to develop a “scientific temper” and to intervene in all these cases, not remain a silent spectator.

The author sincerely acknowledge Ms Charvi Kumar, (PhD schloar, ILI, New Delhi) for her inputs and corrections. 

Sunday, 3 February 2019

MAMATA BANERJEE, RAJEEV KUMAR v CBI (FEB 3, 2019 INCIDENT) : CONSTITUTIONAL And LEGAL ISSUES




In West Bengal a big scam was noticed through ponzi scheme or chit fund type scheme. Companies collected some money and promised to give heavy return. Sardha and other companies were involved in this scheme and scam where the companies cheated lakhs of people most of whom were people from poor and weaker section of society. (poor persons invested even Rs 100 in the scheme).  The Sardha group started its nefarious design in 2006 and the scam was noticed in 2013. This group and other groups may have collected around 20000 crores from West Bengal, Orissa, Assam, Bihar, Tripura and duped millions of people. Mamata Banerjee constituted a special investigation team (SIT) comprising four IPS officers headed by Rajeev Kumar who is currently Commissioner of Police, Kolkata. In 2013 he being head of SIT has investigated the case, collected various documents, electronic evidences, pen drives, CD, etc. Kunal Kumar Ghosh, Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha, Journalist and MP, TMC was arrested in 2013. The Supreme Court on May 9, 2014 ordered CBI to take over investigation of Sardha scam and other similar scam in all concerned States. Certain arrests were made. Srinjoy Bose, Member of Parliament from TMC was arrested in Nov, 2014 by CBI. CBI also summoned four IPS officers constituting SIT to appear and give details of their investigation. Rajeev Kumar, CP, Kolkata has also been summoned at least three times but he did not appear. The CBI also asked for police staff as the volume of scam was too big and the CBI required human resources. CBI approached the Supreme Court regarding non cooperation of the West Bengal government. On July 16, 2018 the Supreme Court observed that such attitude of West Bengal government was "Sorry State of Affairs" and instructed the government to cooperate CBI. The Supreme Court also asked police officers to approach court in case they feel unnecessarily harassed. In August 2018 CBI again summoned Rajeev Kumar who did not turn up. Meanwhile CBI got engaged in its own trouble between two top officers (Alok verma and Rakesh Asthana) where both alleged each other of serious corruption charges followed by removal of CBI director. It seems after the internal conflict of CBI was over, CBI instructed Kolkata office to meet and inquire Rajeev Kumar because CBI apprehended that crucial evidences are destroyed and disappeared. Therefore, to further investigate the CBI team tried to meet Rajeev Kumar, the Police Commissioner of Kolkata.  CBI team was stopped, manhandled and detained by Kolkata Police. Mamata Banerjee alleged that CBI was being used by Modi government because in West Bengal there was a coalition meet of various political parties. Mamata Banerjee has also alleged that CBI has approached Kolkata police without permission of the State government. Is the CBI legally required to seek permission of State government in Sardha chit fund and Rose Valley scam? The answer is no because of two reasons, constitutional and statutory.
A.   Constitutional reason
The Supreme Court ordered CBI to conduct investigation in this scam of Sardha ponzi scheme (Subrata Chattoraj v. Union of India, May 9, 2014). This order is given under article 32 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has exercised its power of judicial review under article 32 which is a part of basic structure of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court exercises constitutional power under article 32 and therefore, this order is above any other provision, be it statutory or executive. If the central government gives CBI any direction to begin a probe, in that case, CBI cannot proceed without the consent of State government because both central and State government are executive authorities and both are bound by the provision (section 6 here) of DSPEA, 1946 (DSPEA deals with CBI). What to tell about Supreme Court, even high court can give direction to CBI to conduct investigation and CBI is not required to seek any permission. This is also not violative of federal feature. (see, State of West Bengal v. CPDR, 2010, a Constitution Bench decision).
B.   Statutory reason
It is being argued that Ms Mamata Banerjee has withdrawn the consent given under section 6 of DSPEA in Nov 2018. The Supreme Court passed a judgement (Subrata Chattoraj v Union of India)on  May 9, 2014 where it ordered the CBI to conduct investigation into the scams to the tune of 10000 crores (and 2015 the Supreme Court apprehended that it may be 20000 crore). Such withdrawal of consent by an executive authority is inconsequential because the order was by the Supreme Court under constitutional power. For the sake of legal discussion only the legal question is whether the withdrawal of such consent has retrospective operation or prospective operation. Will such withdrawal be operative from back date and stop previous investigations? There is another Supreme Court judgement which removes the cloud. In the case of Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation decided on 29 March, 1994, (1994 Supp (2) SCC 116) by a full bench (three judges) the Court held-“ Section 6 of the Act, operates only prospectively and the said withdrawal would not apply to cases which were pending investigation on the date of issuance of the said Notification. The Notification dated January 7, 1987, does not preclude the C.B.I, from submitting the report in the competent court under Section 173 Cr. P.C. on the basis of the investigation conducted by it ….
Therefore, the argument that CBI did not take consent of the West Bengal government or the step of CBI violates federal structure or the consent was withdrawn has no sound legal basis.  Other objections are that there is a court order not to take coercive measure. And CBI did not go with warrant to meet Rajeev Kumar at his residence. For normal inquiry no warrant is required under law that too when the Supreme Court has ordered investigation with free hand. And talking to an SIT chief is not a coercive measure that too when he did not honoured various summons of the CBI and CBI had apprehensions that evidences are destroyed or disappeared.
 The CBI was doing its job and ensuring rule of law be prevailed. The government of West Bengal and the police chief has not discharged their obligation and acted against rule of law. Hope the Supreme Court will take this matter seriously and direct the West Bengal government to cooperate with CBI.

Wednesday, 16 January 2019

LAW AND PRACTICE : A ILLUSTRATIVE CONFLICT BETWEEN RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHT?


Law and practice
Sometime wrong and unlawful practices develop and become normalize so much that it is difficult to defend law. From Mohan Nagar crossing in Ghaziabad to Vaishali metro station (in Ghaziabad), the big autos run everyday which have the permissible capacity of 8 passengers and 1 driver. The auto takes 11 or 12 passengers. This is not only unlawful but sometime creates risk to the security and safety of passengers.  It creates inconvenience to passengers and take more time to start because once the capacity of 8 passengers is full, outside passengers also avoid sitting for comfort. 
Today (Jan 17, 2019) a lady fellow passenger was asking the auto driver to move as the capacity of 8 passengers was full. But the driver was waiting for 3 more passengers as plying with 8 means a loss of Rs 10x3=Rs 30. The lady was being delayed as it was morning time to reach office for everyone. She was expecting fellow passengers also to push for an immediate movement of vehicle. We were silent as we Indians are generally silent (unless it is a religious or caste or political issue). I'm usually outspoken on almost all matters which are lawful or justified. However on this matter I was not only silent but also of the opinion that the driver should take 3 more passengers even if it is not permissible. On certain previous occasions I ve indeed defended the driver taking his daily load of 11 passengers in violation of the permissible limit of 8 passengers. My justification is "Why should the driver lose his Rs 30 on every trip, that too in the morning when with little effort he can find passengers." In the noon it is not possible to find even full capacity of 8 passengers. The driver is earning a few rupees more by making some effort (of course breaching the law and at the discomfort of passengers). 
Then I felt that I ve started defending something that is unlawful in practice and arguing against something that is lawful. By choosing to remain silent I indeed encourage the auto driver and not observing my fundamental duties under Part IVA of the Constitution of India. Is it right for me to do it? Am I offending the rule of law? The whole issue is law vis a vis practice. Right to livelihood of driver vis a vis right of consumer, both a human right. Right of driver to earn more and money vis a vis right of citizen to reach on time or ve lawful comfort and safety. A little discomfort of consumers gives the driver better reward for his employment. Is it a sound conflict between rule of law and human rights of driver? A Yaksh prashn to me. Im trying to find a way in the conflict. 

Sunday, 13 January 2019

CBI v CBI case --ALOK KUMAR VERMA, TRANSFER , NATURAL JUSTICE AND INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY


  

Alok Kumar Verma v. Union of India[1]
(popularly known as CBI v CBI case)

                                                                                                                                                                     I.            Facts

Alok Kumar Verma, was removed from the post of CBI director and transferred to Fire services on the recommendation of a High Power Committee (HPC). This HPC comprised of the PM- Narendra Modi, Justice AK Sikri (who was representative of the Chief Justice of India, Justice Ranjan Gogoi) and Congress leader Mallikarjun Kharge. It was not a unanimous decision because Mallikarjun Kharge noted a long dissent. The majority relied on the CVC reports which contained serious charges against CBI director. The support by Justice Sikri in the majority in HPC indicates there was really something serious with CBI director that he was not fit for the post. The HPC relied on a report of CVC. There were certain allegations against Alok K Verma. The CVC was inquiring charges against Alok K Verma under the supervision of Justice A K Patnaik. Both the report, CVC and Patnaik report was submitted  before the full bench of the Supreme Court who perused the reports. Media reports suggest that Patnaik, J. has insisted that he did not find evidence against Alok K Verma and the finding of CVC is not his finding. This aspect needs some clarity.  
A couple of months back (On October 23, 2018) Alok Kumar Verma, the then CBI director was divested of his powers and was sent on forced leave. Another CBI officer (special director) Rakesh Asthana was also sent for the forced leave. Both made accusations against each other of serious corruption and were fighting like "cats." The action of “forced leave”to both was taken by the Government of India on the recommendation of Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) in the mid night.  
Alok K Varma was aggrieved. He approached the Supreme Court the next day, ie Oct 24, 2018.  On Jan 8, 2018 a full bench of the Supreme Court unanimously quashed orders of CVC and the Government of India. He was reinstated to work as a CBI director but his powers as full fledged CBI director was not restored. He was asked not to take any policy decision which points to the fact that the Court smelled something wrong. The Court also directed the HPC to decide on his powers to function as full fledged CBI director within a week. This direction also denotes that the argument of the central government regarding some an extraordinary situation had some merit. In other words the power of judicial review of administrative decision was exercised classically and merit review was left to the HPC which is an established principle of administrative as well as constitutional law. (See, PJ Thomas judgement, 2011 to find a distinction between judicial review and merit review). In judicial review of classical sense the judiciary does not go in the legality of the decision because it cannot question the choice or wisdom of the decision making body. It can only examine whether the prescribed procedure was followed or not in word and spirit. In modern sense of review (merit review) judiciary can question both procedure as well as decision. This is a limited exercise done in extraordinary cases.    

                                                                                                                                          II.            Ratio of the case

The full bench of the Supreme Court in Alok Verma case relied on following points:
1. Principle (P1) – The Director of CBI should be protected from all extraneous interference and pressure. His independence and impartiality are paramount.
2. Provisions (P2) – The laws were amended to ensure his independence in all matters, be it appointment or removal or transfer. Only a high-powered committee comprising of Prime Minister, Chief Justice of India and Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha is empowered to take such a decision.
3. Precedents (P3) – In 1996, a Constitution bench of the Supreme Court, in Vineet Narayan v. Union of India[2] (a full bench) held that independence of CBI has to be ensured. CBI ought to be insulated from any governmental interference. Therefore, the Court, in Vineet Narayan case issued mandatory directions and the same were incorporated in the statute by way of amendments[3] in 2014. In other words, P1 was propounded in P3 and P2 recognised it.
4. What is the degree of protection or insulation? Whether P1, P2 and P3 intended absolute protection from Government or the Government had some inherent powers to be used in extraordinary situation? The Supreme Court traced this answer through the intention of the Parliament in enacting the amendments.[4] The Court observed that the amendments took away all powers of dealing with appointment and removal from the Government and vested it in the high-powered committee. While some enactments grant the power of removal in exceptional cases to the Government, the CVC Act does not recognise any such power. This indicates the Parliamentary intention was to give all powers only to the high-powered committee and no scope of extraordinary power under unforeseen situation was left for Government. Therefore, inherent power doctrine cannot be invoked in this case.

                                                                                                                                           III.            Interpretation

A.   Parliamentary intention
This case rests on literal and purposive interpretation. The negative way of tracing the intention of the Parliament is used in this case. The intention of the legislature can be traced by positive means. It can also be inferred by negative means. Positive means denote the positive or affirmative presence of some material (like Parliamentary debate, Reports of Parliamentary committees etc) which clearly establishes the desire of the legislature. Negative means denote the absence of provisions which is deliberate. If the provision of removal or extraordinary power or inherent power is provided in certain enactment and similar power is not provided in other enactment, an inference that can be drawn is that the absence is deliberate. The full bench has drawn an analogy that the Parliament never intended to grant any inherent power in the CVC or government as an emergency measure in case of squeezing the power of CBI because of its unique nature while the same is provided under other enactment. This is one of the established tools of interpretation though the negative way may not always be safe. Therefore it is always better to resort to positive means of reading the intention of the  Parliament. Why did the Court in this case not resort to the parliamentary debates? Was it because there was no debate on this point or was it because it was not presented by parties? In both cases it is worrying. It is better to use the debates at first to explore the intention then to resort to guess work of negative means, though in this case the negative means sounds workable.
B.   Rule of law
Another reason to support this finding of the Supreme Court is the principle of rule of law that any grey area in law is a paradise for citizen or petitioner. S/he can take the benefit of that lacuna of legal provision. On the other hand the government authority has to show the express source of power. The source of power cannot be implied. Any grey area is a limitation on the government and a lawyer of a petitioner can is within his jurisdiction to take liberty of that grey area. (See, Jeremy Waldron- The Rule of International Law, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 2006 where he initially differentiates between the meaning of Rule of law for government and citizen) In Alok Verma case the power to remove CBI director was not expressly provided in the CVC Act, 2003. The government cannot read the silence of law in its own favoure. Therefore, the action of the government to send him on “forced leave” was taken in the manifest disregard of the law and the precedents. The central government action to remove Alok K Varma, the then CBI Director without following the prescribed procedure of HPC was against the core values of rule of law, though the government may have best of the intention to ensure the integrity of the institution and may have acted bona fide.  
In pursuance of the Supreme Court judgement (Jan 08, 2019) the HPC met and decided by majority to remove Alok K Verma from CBI Director post and transferred him to Fire department. In other words the HPC restored the decision of CVC and the government of India. The decision of CVC and the government of India was not wrong but procedure to reach that decision was wrong.

                                                                                                                                          IV.            Natural justice

Alok Verma did not join fire department and opted to retire. He and a group of intellectuals as well as media has criticised the decision of HPC on the ground of natural justice and reliance on CVC report. In his letter Alok Verma alleged that before removal from the post and transfer to another department, he was not heard. Alok Verma as a CBI director himself transferred a number of other CBI officers. In less than 48 hours in the office he transferred around 10 officers. He never gave any of them any hearing. None of the transfer was made because of any allegation of corruption or accusation of misconduct. CBI Director was not required to give a fair hearing because transfer is a routine matter. Indeed there is no rule of administrative law to follow natural justice in case of transfer from one post to other post, if the position is transferable. Even suspension does not need the rule of natural justice to be followed. Alok K Verma was not even suspended. Justice Sikri has restated similar principle of administrative law. [He answered a question of Justice Katju.] The difference between transfer, suspension and removal is a “distinction with difference.” Alok K Verma was transferred, neither suspended nor removed. If the person is removed from the service, the rule of natural justice has to be followed. Alok K Verma was not removed from the service but from the post. The advocates of Alok K Verma seem to have been confused between the word service and post. They also seem to be merging the natural justice jurisprudence of removal cases from non removal cases. It would certainly be a great day for administration if such rule could be followed in transfer and suspension also. The advocates of Alok K Verma want a new jurisprudence be followed. Can a new jurisprudence be developed by HPC? Moreover his transfer was not a routine transfer. It was based on certain allegations. For official proceedings such allegations should be mere prima facie in nature.

Sensitive posts, Transfer and natural justice-Judicial precedents

HC judges enjoy greater independence and immunity vis a vis CVC or CBI director because of constitutional status, power to decide matters finally and interpret law exclusively. Indeed their independence in a part of basic structure of the Constitution of India. When a transfer is made by the judicial collegium, there is no rule of natural justice to be followed. In case of allegation against a judge, there is absolutely no scope of natural justice. Union of India v. Sankal Chand Sheth, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2328 can throw light on the issue of transfer and natural justice, especially when high functionary is involved. The issue  before the Constitution Bench was whether a high court judge can be transferred without his consent or not in the light of article 222 (1)  of the Constitution of India. Whether non observance leads to interference in judicial independence? The majority on this point (Chandrachud, Krishna Iyer and Fazal Ali, JJ.) held that the consent of judge is not essential to transfer him. Minority judges (P. N. Bhagwati, Untwalia, JJ.) held it was essential.  The argument again cropped up in SP Gupta case (First Judges case, 1981) A.1.R. 1982 S.C. 149. It is well known that SP Gupta case was overruled on who has the final authority to appoint and transfer judges. However, it is less known that SP Gupta case was not overruled on various other issues. For example, on the issue of locus standi, or interpretation of article 32 it is still the largest bench decision of seven judges where all judges have delivered their separate and concurring opinion. Similarly should the rule of natural justice be followed in transfer of judges? This was again litigated in SP Gupta which still holds the field on transfer issue. In SP Gupta the majority again endorsed the majority opinion of Sankal Chand Sheth that requiring consent was a deliberate omission and not `causus omissus.' (See, “Transfer of High Court Judges and Independence of the Judiciary” by G. Ajith Icumar, Cochin University Law Review 1983). The second (1993) and third judges (1998) case are silent on the issue of transfer and consent. In contrast , CBI Director post is neither constitutional nor judicial post. If a post of high court judge does not need the rule of natural justice to be followed, how come a CBI director claim that due process is violated if natural justice is not given while transferring him from one position to other, that too when his working is alleged to be prima facie suspicious.

                                                                                                                                V.            Institutional integrity

In PJ Thomas (CPIL v. UoI, 2011) is another strong justification for non continuance of Alok K Verma as CBI Director. The full bench in this case has propounded the theory of institutional integrity. Justice Kapadia propounded  a concentrate difference between personal integrity of an officer and the institutional integrity of an officer. In this case High Power Committee recommended the name of PJ Thomas as Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) in 2010. That time P.J. Thomas was accused in criminal case pending in the Court of Special Judge, Thiruvananthapuram with respect to the offences under section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code also known as "Palmolein case". P.J. Thomas allegedly had also played a big part in the cover-up of the 2G spectrum allocation also which was sub-judice. Under the proviso to Section 4(1) of the CVC Act, 2003 the “Parliament has put its faith in the High Powered Committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the minister for Home Affairs and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People.” The HPC (consisting of PM, Home Minister and Leader of opposition) was required to recommend the name of CVC. The majority recommended the name of PJ Thomas but leader of opposition opposed his appointment because of the criminal cases of serious nature against him. His eligibility was not in question because “unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubts he was innocent.” There was no law which prohibited his eligibility based on FIR or investigation. Should such eligible person be not only eligible but also unblemished in nature? There was no legal provision for it. It seemed like a moral requirement. However, the Supreme Court referred N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose [(2009) 7 SCC. Here a person was appointed Additional Judge of Madras high court for two years. There were a number of complaints against him. The complaints were examined by the judicial collegium and he was not recommended as a permanent judge. However, the State government appointed him as the President of State consumer forum. His appointment was challenged. It was argued that he has all eligibility for this post. The Division Bench, however, interpreted that such eligible persons should be “without any blemish whatsoever and that they should not be appointed merely because they are eligible to be considered for the post.” The post is “available for the eligible persons who are retired Judges which would mean that those Judges who had retired from service without any blemish whatsoever and not merely a person who "has been a judge".” Relying on this dictum and precedent Justice Kapadia in PJ Thomas observed :
while making the recommendations, the service conditions of the candidate being a public servant or civil servant in the past is not the sole criteria. The HPC must also take into consideration the question of institutional competency into account. If the selection adversely affects institutional competency and functioning then it shall be the duty of the HPC not to recommend such a candidate. Thus, the institutional integrity is the primary consideration which the HPC is required to consider while making recommendation under Section 4 [of the CVC Act, 2003] for appointment of Central Vigilance Commissioner. In the present case, this vital aspect has not been taken into account by the HPC while recommending the name of Shri P.J. Thomas for appointment as Central Vigilance Commissioner. We do not wish to discount personal integrity of the candidate. What we are emphasizing is that institutional integrity of an institution like CVC has got to be kept in mind while recommending the name of the candidate. [Emphasis added]
This is what is known as institutional integrity principle for the post which is of high public importance. The same principle is applicable in Alok K Verma case. It may be argued that PJ Thomas is not applicable in Alok K Verma case. There is no FIR against Alok K Verma unlike against PJ Thomas. PJ Thomas is more on ethical standard and moral standing of an institution than whether FIR is instituted or not. It is more on the core values of law than on positive law itself.  
At the same time the institution of FIR is not a prerequisite. In N. Kannadasan case there were mere complaints against a former judge. He was eligible for the post of President of consumer forum. However, it was doubtful whether in his regime the consumer forum might command the respect and confidence of people and the staffs because of his alleged previous conduct. In other words the director of CBI should not only be eligible, s/he must be a person without anything blemish. The presence of Alok K Verma in the CBI  was  likely to influence the independence and respect of CBI. Therefore, the HPC has rightly taken the decision to transfer him from CBI to fire department without any opportunity of hearing.  

                                                                                                                              VI.            Concluding remarks

The principle is simple and non-compromising that CVC and CBI has to be independent and impartial. Precedents through the Supreme Court has gone to the extent of exercising the power under article 142 to insulate it from government interference. The provisions have  been made for the same. The developments establish that independence and impartiality of CBI cannot only be attacked by the government but it can be a casualty of money power from private players. Both officers (then CBI no-1, Alok K Verma and no 2, Rakesh Asthana) alleged exchange of bribes in crores of rupees in the matters of CBI(See, Delhi high court decision on Asthana and reports of CVC in media). Such offices need a few people who "Live like hermit but work like a horse." The system, intellectuals and media needs to timely recognise honest and efficient officers. After recognition they should suitably reward them. This has to be collaborative and transparent exercise.
Can the CBI and CVC be given status at par with Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) or the Election Commission to ensure sustaining independence and impartiality? This sounds an attractive proposition but the answer cannot be an easy “yes.” CAG cannot themself enforce law. It gives its findings which is presented before the Parliament. An election Commission (EC) enforces laws during the election time only that too in context of election. Such enforcement has to be ultimately done by police and civil servants. They don’t have their own enforcement officers. If the officers do not follow orders, the EC can only cancel the election and take other steps later on. The CBI can enforce the criminal law themselves. They have their own enforcement officers. They can lodge FIR and arrest a person themselves unlike CAG or EC. Therefore, CVC and CBI may be granted constitutional status at par with CAG and EC with a few checks. But it sounds a remote possibility. The Lokpal is still a dream. However, the judgement will further empower and protect CBI from government interference.




[1] Decided on Jan 8, 2019 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1309 of 2018.
[2] (1998) 1 SCC 226.
[3]  Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 as amended by act 1 of 2014 w.e.f. 16-1-2014 and by act 28 of 2014 w.e.f. 29-11-2014.
[4] Ibid.

Saturday, 12 January 2019

Allegations based on status of Poverty, Gender Justice and human rights via “354 me band kara dungi”


Allegations based on status of poverty and human rights via
“354 me band kara dungi”
It was evening of Jan 11, 2019. I was enjoying tea with my two friends in the canteen of the Indian Law Institute, New Delhi. Two ladies (a mother and a daughter who seems to be an advocate) rushed to the canteen inquiring about their mobile phone. They alleged that while they were taking lunch, cleaning staff of canteen has taken the mobile phone while collecting the used plates and glass from the table. They were very much worried and agitated which was obvious. They were asking the canteen employee to return the cell phone and indicating that they can find it easily because of some influential source. I, with my friends requested them to cool down and make a call on the number. The young advocate made a call and showed me that the number is still ringing. We noticed that the call is responding some were because we could hear the ring of a phone. Suddenly she found that the cell phone was placed on the seat of the chair where they were taking lunch. They seemed happy but were not in a mood to accept the fault on their side. Now the owner of canteen came and asked her that why did she allege the canteen staff that they have stolen it. There were a few exchange of words of allegations against each other. We again requested them to leave the matter as the cell phone was recovered. The young lawyer asked her mother to leave the premise and the mother left the canteen. The young lady lawyer was in adamant to engage in verbal fight. Now she also started speaking in English, “don’t talk to me loud” etc. As we were there we can say that the canteen owner did expressed his loud displeasure on the allegation of taking away mobile phone while collecting used utensils, he did not speak anything which was objectionable. The lady lawyer left the canteen with the last sentence which was height of her unruly behaviour. She told “ 354 me band kara dungi.” Though my friends and canteen owner could not realise immediately what it meant, I could easily understand it. (Section 354 of IPC deals with “Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty” which has been amended in 2013 with enhanced penalty. CrPC 1973 was also amended and special procedure for registration of FIR by a lady police officer has been made and non registration of FIR under section 354 is an offence under section 166A of IPC). Canteen staff was advised that he should call 100 and inform that a lady has threatened like this. The police came and they also met me in my chamber. The story was narrated to the police officer. One diploma student of the Indian Law Institute, who was also a lawyer commented that that a few persons like her are bringing disrepute to the noble profession of Bar.  
The misuse of law has emerged as a necessary evil. While there is no denying that special laws and procedure is essential to protect the cause of gender justice, it is equally important that the misuse of laws be “nipped in its bud.” Such misuse are no more in margins and cannot be avoided as a number of high courts and a few Supreme Court judgements indicate (specially in sexual assault cases). The human rights movement to promote the cause of gender justice through criminal laws will lose its vigour if the misuse of laws by female remain unaddressed. I have also witnessed that various distinguished scholars and feminist authors are not willing to accept this fact as serious enough and they either feel the misuse does not exist or it is media projection or overrating the problem or even normalising such instances. The reaction of esteemed woman organisations on Arnesh Kumar judgement or Rajesh Sharma judgement also reflects the scenario. This comment is not based on one incident at canteen and not a generalisation. This feeling is based on certain judicial decisions which categorically admitted the misuse. News papers do cover similar items indicating abuse of female related laws almost every month. This feeling is also based on interaction with police and judicial officers. A dissertation of the Indian Law Institute submitted under this author also form the foundation of this feeling. However, this feeling is yet to be a research finding. Misuse of any law (especially those which deal with half of the population of country) is a big hurdle in the march of gender justice movement to protect, promote and preserve the human rights of woman.
This leads me to two observations. One, researchers need to focus on this aspect to dispassionately examine whether such abuse is really serious to take note of. Or is such instance of abuse avoidable as a part of necessary evil of any criminal law. They should suggest socio-legal measures to check this growing tendency, if it is really acute.  Two, it is very easy to allege especially when a poor and weak person is involved. The status of poverty or being needy (financially) makes a person (a daily wager, a labour, a canteen staff, a security guard, a driver, a domestic servant, a cleaning staff, a beggar etc) an easy prey of our judgement accusation based on fictional thinking and classical presumption that crimes are generally “caused by poverty or by personal and social characteristics believed to be associated statistically with poverty, including feeblemindedness, psychopathic deviations, slum neighbourhoods, and deteriorated families” which was refuted by Sutherland. The allegations and accusations on someone because of a person’s status of poverty or being in lower income group is a gross human rights violations by those similar to non state actors.

Thursday, 20 September 2018

Instant Triple Talaq Ordinance तीन तलाक अध्यादेश २०१८ [मुस्लिम महिला (विवाह अधिकारों का संरक्षण) अध्यादेश, २०१८] :

तीन तलाक अध्यादेश २०१८ [मुस्लिम महिला (विवाह अधिकारों का संरक्षण) अध्यादेश २०१८] सारे देश में २० सितम्बर २०१८ से लागू हो गया है लेकिन खेद है कि तकनीकी कारणों से यह जम्मू कश्मीर में लागू नहीं होगा. इस अध्यादेश में कुल ७ प्रावधान हैं. यह कानून केवल तत्काल तीन तलाक (तलाक ए बिद्दत) के मामलों में लागू है. उसे अवैध और अपराध घोषित करता है. मुस्लिम विधि में दिए जाने वाले अन्य प्रकार के तलाक पर यह क़ानून लागू नहीं है, वे अभी भी वैध हैं. एक स्वागत योग्य कदम है.
यह कई बार सुनने और पढने को मिलता है कि मुस्लिम पति ने अपनी पत्नी को तलाक तलाक तलाक कह दिया और अब उससे पत्नी का कोई रिश्ता नहीं है. इसे तत्काल तीन तलाक या तलाक ए बिद्दत कहा जाता है. इस क़ानून की धारा ३ के अनुसार पति द्वारा तत्काल तीन तलाक (तलाक ए बिद्दत) कहना गैर कानूनी और शून्य है और उसके तीन तलाक कहने का विवाह पर कोई असर नहीं पड़ेगा. न ही वह अब हराम होगी और न ही उसे हलाला करना पड़ेगा. (हलाला का अर्थ है—तलाकशुदा मुस्लिम पत्नी द्वारा पति के अलावे किसी अन्य व्यक्ति से शारीरिक सम्बन्ध बनाना जिसके बाद वह पुनः अपने पति के साथ पत्नी के रूप में रह सकती है. हलाला वास्तव में रेप या बलात्कार की श्रेणी में आता है क्योंकि अधिकांश हलाला मामलों में पत्नी राजी खुशी से पति के अलावा अन्य व्यक्ति से सम्बन्ध नहीं बनाती.) इस नए क़ानून की धारा ३ वास्तव में शायरा बानो के मामले में सर्वोच्च न्यायालय के निर्णय (२२ अगस्त २०१७) की विधायी स्वीकृति है. शायरा बानो के मुकदमे में संविधान पीठ के पांच सदस्यों में से तीन सदस्यों ने बहुमत से तत्काल तीन तलाक को गैर कानूनी माना था. (दो जजों ने इसे असांविधानिक माना जबकि एक जज ने इस्लाम के विरुद्ध बताया था). दो अल्पमत जजों ने इसे गैर कानूनी तो नहीं माना लेकिन गलत करार दिया और संसद को इसपर विधि बनाने का सुझाव दिया. तीन तलाक अध्यादेश २०१८ की धारा ३ का यह अर्थ हुआ कि तीन तलाक के कारण न तो मुस्लिम महिला को उसके घर से निकलना होगा और न ही कोई उसे निकाल सकता और न ही घर आने से रोक सकता है, न उसे धर्म के नाम पर हलाला जैसे कृत्य के लिए बाध्य होना होगा.
धारा ४ के अनुसार पति द्वारा तीन तलाक बोलने को अपराध घोषित किया गया है. ऐसा बोलने पर या लिखने पर या waatsapp पर या पत्र द्वारा या vdo कॉल पर आदि तरीकों से तत्काल तीन तलाक देने पर पति को तीन साल तक की जेल हो सकती है. ऐसी सैकड़ों घटनाएं विगत अनेक वर्षों से होती आ रही थीं. यहाँ तक कि सर्वोच्च न्यायलय के निर्णय के बाद भी ८० के आस पास ऐसी घटनाएं हुई थी. भारतीय समाज में चाहे हिन्दू हो या मुस्लिम, पुरुष स्त्रियों पर अनेक बार अकारण निरंकुश तरीके से व्यवहार करते हैं, क्रूरता करते हैं. इसी कारण दहेज़ क़ानून १९६१ में आया. इसी कारण से 498A, भारतीय दंड संहिता में १९८३ में लाया गया. स्त्रियों के जानोमाल और सम्मान की रक्षा के लिए अन्य प्रावधान लाये गए. इनसे भारतीय समाज के सामंतवादी मानसिकता वाले पुरुष और उनका साथ देने वाले परिवार के लोगों में थोडा क़ानून का भय भी आया. यद्यपि कि इससे स्थिति में बहुत सुधार नहीं आया है और इन कानूनों का अनेक बार दुरूपयोग भी हो रहा है. लेकिन क्रूरता और मनमानेपन के काम को अपराध घोषित करने से कुछ लगाम लगी है. चुकी मुस्लिम समुदाय में भी तत्काल तीन तलाक क्रूरता और मनमानापन का आसन जरिया बन गया था, मुस्लिम पत्नियों और उनके बच्चों का जीवन, उनकी गरिमा और प्रतिष्ठा विनष्ट हो रही थी, सर्वोच्च न्यायालय के आदेश के बाद भी उसका कोई असर नहीं दीख रहा था और न ही मुस्लिम धार्मिक नेता इस अन्याय को कम करने के लिए कोई ठोस प्रयास कर रहे थे, न ही बड़ी संख्या में मुस्लिम बुद्धिजीवी तत्काल तीन तलाक की बुराई को रोकने के लिए खुल कर सामने आ रहे थे. इसलिए तत्काल तीन तलाक को अपराध घोषित करने के अलावा कोई चारा नहीं था.
धारा ५ के अनुसार पत्नी को पति से अपना और अपने बच्चे के भरण पोषण के लिए रोज का खर्च लेने का अधिकार है. यह प्रावधान इसलिए आवश्यक था क्योंकि पुलिस में मामला जाने के बाद पति या उसके परिवार के लोग बदला लेने के लिए पत्नी को उसकी रोज की जरूरत से महरूम कर सकते हैं.
धारा ६ में उसे अधिकार है कि वह अवयस्क बच्चे (१८ साल तक ) को अपने पास रख सकती है. उसकी कस्टडी उसे दी जायेगी.
धारा ७ (क) के अनुसार तत्काल तीन तलाक का अपराध आंशिक रूप से ही संज्ञेय है. अर्थात, पुलिस तत्काल तीन तलाक का मुकदमा केवल तभी दर्ज करेगी और पति को गिरफ्तार केवल तभी किया जा सकता है जबकि तत्काल तीन तलाक का मामला पत्नी स्वयं या उसके निकट के रिश्तेदार दर्ज करते हैं. यदि तत्काल तीन तलाक की सूचना पत्नी के दोस्तों या दूर के रिश्तेदारों या पड़ोसियों से मिलती है तो पुलिस FIR दर्ज करने के लिए बाध्य नहीं है और न ही मजिस्ट्रेट की अनुमति के बिना ही उसे गिरफ्तार कर सकती है. धारा ७ (ख) के अनुसार यह अपराध compoundable या शमनीय है अर्थात पत्नी चाहे तो मजिस्ट्रेट की अनुमति से इस मामले को रफा दफा करा सकती है. धारा ७ (ग) के अनुसार यदि पत्नी या उसके निकट के रिश्तेदारों ने तत्काल तीन तलाक का मामला दर्ज कराया है, और पुलिस ने उसे गिरफ्तार किया है, तो बेल या जमानत देने के पहले मजिस्ट्रेट पीड़ित मुस्लिम पत्नी को जरूर सुनेगा, और तभी उचित आधारों पर जमानत देगा. यह आवश्यक नहीं है कि पुलिस उसे गिरफ्तार करे ही क्योंकि ७ साल से कम की सजा वाले में पुलिस को धारा ४१क दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता, CrPC 1973 के अंतर्गत पहले नोटिस देना जरूरी है. बिना नोटिस केवल आपवादिक दशा में ही गिरफतार कर सकती है, जैसे आरोपी से ख़तरा हो, भाग जाने की संभावना हो आदि. [अर्नेश कुमार के मामले में भी २ जुलाई २०१४ को सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की दो न्यायाधीशों की पीठ ने यही निर्देश जारी किया है कि अनावश्यक गिरफ्तारी होने पर पुलिस के विरुद्ध विभागीय कार्यवाही होगी और न्यायालय की अवमानना का मामला भी बनेगा. १४ सितम्बर २०१८ को सोशल एक्शन फोरम फार मानव अधिकार (या राजेश शर्मा-२) के मामले में सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की पूर्ण पीठ (तीन न्यायाधीश) ने अर्नेश कुमार के निर्देशों पर अपनी मुहर लगा दी है.] इसलिये जब तक आवश्यक न हो पुलिस मुस्लिम पति को गिरफ्तार नहीं कर सकती. यदि पति पत्नी से गिले शिकवे दूर कर ले तो तत्काल तीन तलाक का अपराध को कोर्ट समाप्त कर देगी. उसे जेल जाने की नौबत ही नहीं आयेगी. इस प्रकार तीन तलाक अध्यादेश २०१८ [मुस्लिम महिला (विवाह अधिकारों का संरक्षण) अध्यादेश, २०१८] न केवल मुस्लिम स्त्रियों के “अबला जीवन” को “सबला जीवन” में बदलेगा, उनके दुःख को थोड़ा कम करेगा, वरन भारत में हर धर्म की महिलाओं पर हो रहे विभेद और अत्याचार को रोकने की दिशा में एक मील का पत्थर साबित होगा. हिन्दू पारिवारिक विधियों में भी जो बुराइयां हैं या कमियां हैं, उन्हें भी क़ानून बनाकर दूर करने की जरूरत है.

Saturday, 8 September 2018

District Court Judges who became judge of the Supreme Court-


यह अक्सर कहा जाता है कि उच्चतम न्यायालय में केवल पहुंच वालों की या बड़े वकीलों  जज के घर वालों की नियुक्ति होती है। यह बात सच हो सकती है लेकिन यह भी सच है कि सामान्य घर के लोग (जस्टिस कपाड़िया पूर्व cji), भी अपनी मेहनत और लगन से शीर्ष तक पहुंचते हैं। मित्रों के साथ whatsapp पर चर्चा के दौरान जो जानकारी मिली वह उत्साहवर्धक है--
Judges who appointed in Supreme court but we're district judge.
1. Justice Banumathi appointed in as district judge in 1988, then elevated to high court in 2003, then in Supreme court in 2014.
 2. Justice AM Ahmadi Appointed in Ahmadabad district court in 1964, then elevated to Gujrat high court in 1974 the in the Supreme court in 1988.
3. K. T. Thomas (Justice), 1977 dist judge, kerala, 1985 high court and 1996 supreme court.
4. Chokkalingam Nagappan, 1987 district judge, 2000 HC Madras and 2013 Supreme court
5. Justice Prafulla Chandra Pant, 1976, he qualified up pcs,j. In 1990 promoted to district judge in up. 2004 additional judge high court uttarakhand, 2008 permanent judge High Court uk, 2014 supreme court
6. Ms. Justice M. Fathima Beevi, Born on 30.4.1927 in Pathanamthitta (Kerala); Father: Mr. Meera Sahib; Family: Single, living with Mother Khadeeja Bibi. Schooling from Catholicate High School, Pathanamthitta, B.Sc. (University College, Trivandrum), B.L. (Law College, Trivandrum); Enrolled as Advocate on 14.11.1950, Appointed as Munsiff in the Kerala Sub-ordinate Judicial Services in May, 1958, Promoted as the Sub-ordinate Judge in 1968, Promoted as the Chief Judicial Magistrate in 1972, Promoted District & Sessions Judge in 1974, Appointed as the Judicial Member of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in January, 1980, Elevated to the High Court as a Judge on 4.8.1983, Became permanent Judge of the High Court on 14.3.1984.Retired as the Judge of the High Court on 29.4.1989. Elevated to the Supreme Court as a Judge on 6.10.1989....https://www.sci.gov.in/chief-justice-judges

7. Palekar, Devidas Ganpat, B.A., LL.B.-Born 4th September, 1909 in North Kanara District; Educated at Government High School, Karwar, Elphinstone College and Government Law College, Bombay. Enrolled as an Advocate of Bombay High Court on 2nd February 1934. Practised both Civil and Criminal cases on the Appellate Side of that High Court. Joined Bombay Judicial Service as Civil Judge, Junior Division, on 9th June 1939. Became Assistant Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge in September, 1949. Deputy Secretary to the State Government in Legal Department from 1954 to 1956. District Judge from August, 1956 to September, 1958. Appointed as Additional Registrar of Bombay High Court from October, 1958 and became Registrar of that High Court on 15th January 1959. Appointed as Additional Judge of the High Court at Bombay for two years from 14th October 1961. Permanent Judge from 27th August 1962. Judge, Supreme Court of India from 19th July 1971.


There are others who qualified subordinate judiciary but resigned and finally made way to the Supreme Court of India, like Swatantra Kumar